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CHAPTER - I 
DEPOSIT BANKING 
Deposit banking is the term used for any form of a regular, 
usually recorded, business of accepting deposits and advancing 
loans (out of funds made available by those deposits), carried on 
by individuals or firms. Implicit in these functions is the 
ultimate ability of the deposit banker to create credit or 'bank 
money'. Though modern banks perform a variety of functions 
besides these two, these still remain the essential elements of 
all banking. 
About the origins of deposit banking in India little is 
2 
known. Usury was certainly practised in the i> ixth century B.C., 
but we do not know anything about the accumulation and commercial 
use of usurious capital. In medieval times, from references to 
the merchant usurers in the documents and chronicles of the 
thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, it seems that it was largely 
the merchant's capital which took the form of usurer's capital. 
A.P. Usher, 'The Origins of Banking: The Primitive Bank of 
Deposit, 1200-1600', The Economic History Review, ed.E. 
Lipson and R.H.Tawney, vol. IV 1932-34, pp. 399-400. Perhaps 
originating with the practice of depositing personal valua-
bles, deposit banking changed its primitive forms with the 
growth of large scale commerce and use of money, and got 
institutionalized. The first specialised bankers in Europe, 
the Genoese money dealers, appeared in the thirteenth 
century. They came to be known as 'bankers' from the bench 
('banca') they usually sat on. Similarly, the term 
'bankrupt' also came into use when creditors broke the bench 
of an insolvent banker. Thompson, Dictionary of Banking, 
London, 1911, p. 74; Alfred Marshall, Money, Credit and 
Commerce, London, 1923, pp. 295-97. 
R.S. Sharma, Material Culture and Social Formations in Anci-
ent India, Delhi, 1983, pp. 125-6; 'Usury in Early Medieval 
India' in Light on Early Indian Society and Economy, Bombay 
1966, Chapter XI. 
In the Lekkhapaddhati documents of the thirteenth century, a class 
of merchant usurers (dhanik, vyavahTra, sresthl) are found advan-
3 
cing money loans on interest. Zia Barani, accounting for the 
wealth of the Multanis and sahs of Delhi in the thirteenth century, 
suggests that a large part of their wealth was derived from the 
resources of Balban's nobles, who took up money from them on loan 
and paid them in drafts (qab^ha) on the revenues of their igtas 
(territories). The sahs and .flultanis in this period were basically 
merchants. We, however, learn of people, not described as 
merchants or by any caste-name, who discounted salary drafts 
of the soldiers in the fourteenth century Delhi Sultanate, as they 
6 
were negotiable bills. The sarrafs (lit. money testers) are 
reported to have performed this function in the seventeenth 
7 
century. The sarrafs figure in a fourteenth century history, 
when along with merchants they are said to have offered money 
8 
to Firoz Tughlaq at Sarsuti in 1351. The fact that the king 
3. Pushpa Prasad, 'Credit and Mortgage Documents in the Lekkha-
paddhati', Indian History Congress, Goa, 1987 (duplicated), 
pp. 209-33. 
4. Zia Barani, Tarlkh 1 FFrozshahi, ed. Shaikli Abdur Rashld, 
Allgarh, 1957, Vol, I, p.*141. 
5. Irfan Habib in, CEHI, vol. I, ed. Tapan Ray Chaudhuri and 
Irfan Habib, Cambridge, 1982, pp. 85-86. 
6. Shams SIra"j Afif, TarFkh i Flrogshahi, ed. Maulvi Vilayat 
Khan, Calcutta, 1891, pT- 296-7. 
7. Niccolao Manucci, Storia Do Mogor (1699-1709), trans. 
W. Irvine 4 vols., London, 1907-8, vol. II, p. 354. 
8. Afif, op.cit., p. 61. 
.. .3/-
considered this amount to be a loan and promised to repay it 
later, suggests that the sarrafs had already established them-
selves as money-lenders. There are eplgraphic references to the 
9 
Jain 'bankers' in late twelveth and early thirteenth century, 
but since nothing is explained about their functions, the use of 
the term 'banker' remains obscure. The limited monetary base of 
the empires in this period and the reticence of our sources 
strengthen the presumption against widespread practice of deposit 
banking. 
It was not until the seventeenth century that one identifies 
the aspects of deposit banking explicitly. The Mughal Indian 
deposit banking now appears largely as the domain of the sarrafs, 
though even other professional groups also loosely functioned as 
deposit bankers. The sarrafs actually specialised in the 
12 business of money changing and bullion, a profession which 
channelised money into their hands. Very much like the goldsmiths 
of Ellgland, who combined deposits in precious metals with the 
issue of promlsory notes and making of loans, the Mughal Indian 
9. L.C. Jain, Indigenous Banking in India, London, 1929,pp.11,127 
10. Information available to the modern researchers suggests 
that the countries of the Near liast in the middle ages wit-
nessed widespread banking activities. The Jewish and Chris-
tian bankers immensely increased the liquidity of commercial 
capital through cheques (sakk), bonds (khatt) and letters of 
credit (suftaja), E. Ashtor, A Social~and Economic History 
of Near East in Middle Ages, London, 1976, pp.lA-i-S. 
11. One may recall that it was with the business of the money-
changers that deposit banking was largely associated in 
medieval European economies. Usher, op.cit., pp.AOA, 407; 
Marshall, op.cit., pp.295-97. 
n. contd : 
?arrafs employed their capital in discounting bills of exchange 
(hundis) and advancing loans on interest. But, besides extending 
short term commercial credit the sarrafs performed yet another 
important function which indicates their ability to create credit. 
An English factor, while reporting commercial practices at 
Patna, informs us that the merchants, who traded in bullion alone, 
15 
bought commodities in the market through bills of exchange. 
Similarly, Tavernier describes the process of buying dimonds at 
Rammalkota by drawing bills on the sarrafs either at Rammalkota or 
at other places, preferably Surat, where the diamond sellers 
themselves bought commodities. Another incident of a similar 
nature is witnessed in the case of Khwaja Minas, an Armenian 
merchant of Surat. When forced to repay his long standing debts 
owed to the English, Khwaja Minas paid both in cash and bills, 
which his broker drew in favour of the English. The bills drawn 
n. contd. 
12. Banarsidas, Ardhakathanak ed. Mukund Lath, Jaipur 1981, 
text pp. 227, 262-5; Irfan Habib, 'Banking in Mughal India', 
pp. 1-7; Om Prakash, 'Foreign Merchants and Mughal Mints', 
in The Imperial Monetary System of Mughals, ed. J.F.Richards, 
Delhl^ 1987, pp. 171-92. 
13. Maurice Dobb, Studies in the Development of Capitalism London 
1963, p. 189. 
14. Factories, 1651-54, p. 51; 1655-60 pp. 18-19; Factories (NS) 
1670-77, p. 286; 1680-84, pp. 253-54; Annals, Vol. Ill, 
p.376, Irfan Habib, 'Usury in Medieval India', pp. 401-7. 
15. Temple, p. 366. 
16. Tavernier, II, pp. 47-8. 
17. Factories (NS), 1670-77, pp. 238-9. 
in the last two cases were to be discounted by the sarrafs. Though 
nothing is known about the sarrifs ' own mcide of payment, which 
might or might not have been in cash, the sarrafs, while settling 
the transactions by clearance, acted purely as bankers. In these, 
and other similar cases, the ?arrafs made the clearance in two 
ways: either they created credit deposits by discounting the 
merchants' bills or they already held cash deposits with them to 
18 
honour bills. 
While it is true that the sarrafs maintained their accounts 
19 
in their traditional manner, none of their records have unfortu-
nately survived from the seventeenth century. it is, therefore, 
not clear when and how the sarrafs took to accepting simple 
deposits. It has been suggested that perhaps with the growth 
of commerce, when the demand for capital increased and the 
sarrafs capital, mainly generated from money-changing and usury, 
18. Mirat-i-Sikandari, ed. S.C. Misra and M.L. Rahman, Baroda, 
1961, pp. 404-5. 
19. Tavernier, II, pp. 143-44. 
did not suffice to meet the mounting demand of the credit market, 
they tended to Increase their capital by attracting hitherto 
20 Uninvested resources as Interest earning deposits. 
The garcafs accepted cash deposits essentially in two ways : 
the short-term 'conditional deposits' which they accepted while 
itisulng bills of exchange (hundls) to anyone who needed payment 
elsewhere; and 'demand deposits', accepted from the merchants, 
nobles and other wealthy people of the empire. While the first 
type of deposit is discussed in detail elsewhere, it is with 
the 'demand deposits' that we are largely concerned here. 
Pelsaert informs us about a class of people at Agra who 
21 lived mainly on Interest. It is however, the report of an 
English factor from Agra which explicitly delineates the features 
of this trade : 
"Those that are great monied men in the towne, and live only 
upon Interest receive from the sheroffs noe more than 5/8 percent 
per month. The sheroffs they disposed of it to others (at) from 
1 to 2j percent, running some hazard for the same, and that is 
their gaines. Now when a sheroff [sarraf] (for lucre) hath 
disposed of great sommes to persons of qualities at great rates, 
not suddenly to be called In to serve his occasslons, then beglnn 
his credltours (as in other parts of the world) like sheepe one to 
runn over the neck of another, and quite stifle his reputac ion. 
20. Irfan Habib, 'Usury in Medieval India', p. 345; Caste and 
Money in Indian History, Bombay, 1986 p. 34. 
21. Franslsco Pelsaert, Remonstrantie, tr. Jahangir's India, by 
Moreland and Geyl, Cambridge, 1925, pp. 28-9. 
Thus ... hath two famous sheroffs bynn served within a month, one 
of which falling for above three lack of rupees, diverse men have 
lost great somes and others totally undone thereby; which hath 
caused men of late to bee very tlmerous of putting their monies 
into sheroffs hands '.^ 
This is an interesting example of deposits payable on demand, 
tacitly explaining the low interest rate paid on them. The entire 
amount deposited by diverse creditors was suddenly withdrawn 
probably as a result of some immediate demand for capital which, 
in case of conditional deposits, would have been called back at 
different intervals. These 'great monied men' were probably the 
Mughal nobles, some of whom are known to have practised usury and 
commerce; but perhaps many of them kept their money with sarrafs. 
The latter, thus, performed the outstanding function of dishoarding 
idle balances which, as we saw, they further employed in usury at 
a higher rate of interest obviously running certain risks of the 
22. Factories, 1642-45, p. 303. 
23. For an eighteenth century description of 'demand deposits' 
of the sarrafs, see Khulasat ut Twarikh, p. 25. 
24. Mundy, II, p. 290, for Mughal Officials lending money on 
interest. Satlsh Chandra, 'Some Aspects of the Growth of a 
Money Economy in India During the Seventeenth Century', 
lESHR, vol. Ill, No.4, Delhi, 1966, pp. 321-32; Athar All, 
The Mughal Nobility Under Aurangazeb, Bombay, 1966, pp.154-60; 
2^ 
market. In aHiother report, the sarrafs at Dharangaon (Khandesh) 
26. 
are described as 'servents' of wealthy men residing elsewhere. 
The English factors once pressed their company for sending a 
double stock of capital since the garrafs were willing to pay 
27 
7} percent per annum as Interest on deposits. In Bengal, it 
appears that the sarrafs were regularly working as deposit bankers 
to the English in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth 
28 
century. 
Not only the wealth of merchants and nobles but also the 
moneys of the state could be put in deposit with the sarrafs. In 
1623, when Prince Khurram ordered his 'treasure' to be transported 
to Mandu, the sarrafs of Ahmadabad were asked to make the 
25. To match the hazards of non-payment, there were various 
techniques of exaction. See, for instance, the position 
taken by Khuaja Minas, a longstanding debtor of the English, 
that recovery of a usurious sum is forbidden by 'Muhammadan 
Law. (Factories (NS), 1670-77, p. 239).The method the English 
adopted to recover the amount, called dharna, had an inter-
esting Indian origin. Jain, op. cit. , p.9. 
26. Factories (NS), 1680-84, pp. 253-54. But, of course, not 
all 'wealthy men' pref.erred lending money on interest. 
Factories (NS), 1680-84, pp. 253-54. 
27. Factories, 1655-60, p. 199. 
28. Annals, 1, p. 300. 
29* 
remittance which caused a 'great scarcity of money' at Ahmadabad. 
Had the 'treasure' been already in a cash-hoard and now put with 
sarrafs for transmission through bills to Mandu, it should have 
caused a superfluity, not scarcity, of money at Ahmedabad. A 
scarcity would only have arisen if the 'treasure' had been 
previously deposited with sarrafs to be lent out by them at 
interest, and now that it had to be transferred to Mandu, the 
were 
sarrafs at Ahmedabad/compelled to recall their loans, thereby 
causing there a scarcity of credit money. 
The system of credit and the institution of intermediaries 
in and between markets grew in similar historical circumstances, 
3C 
mainly, the break in the immediacy of the process of exchange. 
It is, therefore, not surprising that the brokers occupied a 
significant position in the organisation of credit and commerce 
in Mughal India along with the §arrafs. 
29. Factories. 1622-23, p. 181. 
30. John Eaton, Political Economy, A Marxist Text Book, Bombay 
1952, p. 29; Fernand Braudel, Civilization and Capitalism, 
II, The Wheels of Commerce, London 1982, p. 412. 
10 :: 
31 
The brokers were basically commodity brokers, i.e. those 
who acted as intermediaries between the primary producer and the 
merchants, on varying degrees of commission. In north India, they 
generally belonged to the bani^ communities and were distinguished 
from other professional commercial groups by their specialization 
a3 
in this field. The "credit brokers' belonged to the same genre, 
but by virtue of their knowledge of different types of coins and 
bills, they provided credit facilities to their clients through 
diverse means, besides performing their primary function of 
brokerage. The English and Dutch factors normally raised funds 
from the money market through brokers. Even when the agency of 
the sarrafs were employed by them for transactions in bills of 
exchange (hundis), the expertise of a broker had to be harnessed. 
There is a case of broker's manipulation of exchange rate of bill 
35 
money in connivance with the sarrafs for mutual gain. The brokers 
31. Ibid., pp. A9-50; also Ashin Das Gupta, 'The Merchant of 
Surat C. 1700-1750', In Elites in South Asia, ed. E. Leach 
and S. Mukherjee, Cambridge, 1970, pp. 215-6 for a different 
view on commodity brokers. 
32. A.J. Qalsar, 'The Role of Brokers in Medieval India', njR 
New Delhi, 1 (2), 1974, pp. 220-46. 
33. Habib, 'Merchant Communities', pp. 24-25. 
34. Factories, 1634-36, pp. 50; Factories (NS), 1680-84, pp.238-9 
A Dutch broker is once reported to have raised Rs.600,000 
for his clients. 
35. A Supplementary Calendar of Documents , in the India Office 
relating to India, or to Home Affairs of the East India 
Company, 1600-64, ed. W. Foster, London 1928, pp. 64-66; 
also Tavernier 1, pp. 33-34 for their connection with Mughal 
mint officials and manipulation of exchange rates. 
11 
could also insist that bills should be drawn to their advantage. 
The Surat broker of the English factors, Mahidas, once started 
obstructing the honouring of bills drawn from Cambay on the plea 
that this course did not leave him any profit. Instead, he 
suggested remittances from Surat through his agency. The brokers 
also stood surety for their clients for the redemption of credit 
bills. On one such occasion, a Dutch merchant made payments to his 
37 
broker to clear his purchases obtained on credit. It is, there-
fore, not surprising that the English were compelled to employ 
Tapidas, a leading broker of Surat, as their 'Shroff. 
A major source of the brokers' income was the commission 
39 
they received both from the buyers and the sellers. When employed 
AO 
as agents of the merchants, they received regular salaries. For 
those who served the English merchants either as commission agents 
or regular employees, there was yet another source of income. The 
English, when they advanced money to the primary suppliers for 
the goods they needed, did it through the brokers, who, in turn. 
36. Factories, 1622-23, p. 171. 
37. Ibid., p. 199. 
38. Factories, 1618-21, p.98; 1642-45, p.21. 
39. Supplementary Calendar, op.cit., p. 70; Factories, 1618-21, 
pp. 194-5; Ovlngton, A Voyage to Surat in the Year 1689, ed. 
H.G. Rawlinson, London, 1929, p. 233. 
40. Factories, 1651-54, p. 112; Qaiser, op.cit., p.234. 
12 
41 
charged interest on these advances from the suppliers. 
There is ample evidence of the English leaving money into 
the hands of the brokers, sometimes not their employees, for 
42 
investment, and which at times remained in their hands for long. 
Besides, the cash of the English Company was always kept with its 
broker, Tapidas, till the need was felt to hold the stock in the 
4.3 
hands of Companys' servants. An English broker was ready to 
forfeit Rs. 100,000 to the Governnor of Surat to secure the 
44 
commercial Interests of his clients. The brokers also supple-
45 
mented their business with Independent trading activities. 
All this naturally often resulted in the concentration of 
large deposits of money in the hands of the brokers. There is 
evidence of the brokers' lending money to the English at Surat, 
46 
Broach, and in the Deccan. Benidas, who replaced Tulsidas Parakh 
41. This aspect is discussed in some detail in Chapter VI, 
42. Factories (NS), 1680-84, pp. 345-46; Factories, 1618-21, 
p.98; Factories (NS), 1670-77, p. 236. 
43. Factories, 1634-36, pp. 169, 226. 
44. Factories, 1651-54, p. 281. 
45. Factories, 1642-45, p. 21. 
46. Factories, 1618-21, pp. 117, 338; 1655-68, p. 364. 
13 
as the broker of the English Company, was found lending Rs.200,000 
47 
to the English at the rate of 5/8 percent, per month. In 1720, 
we find a merchant of Bengal, Varanasi Seth, who served as 
Company's broker, lending money to the English on interest through 
48 
bills of exchange. The English company was always chary of making 
large advances to the brokers, suspecting that they used the money 
for their own profit through lending at interest to others 
49. 
unconnected with the Company's business. 
Large-scale money-lending, however, does not seem to have 
been practised by the brokers since the commercial capital at 
their disposal was limited in relation to the demand in the 
market. One finds that in the beginning, a distinction was 
maintained by the English between the money raised on interest 
from the market and that raised through the brokers. 
47. Factories, 1651-54, pp. 119, 142. 
48. Annals, 1, p. 223. 
49. Factories, 1618-21, pp. 98, 104; Factories (NS), 1680-84, 
pp. 245-6. 
50. Factories, 1618-21, p. 117. 
14 
Nevertheless, it seems that the professional brokers, meshed 
with the commercial network, had developed a plurality of skills 
and sometimes themselves received deposits and advanced loans on 
interest. As for the brokers who were associated with big 
merchants or one of the European Companies, there is evidence to 
indicate that they made investments, satisfied debts and cleared 
transactions for their clients. 
The big merchant usurers in Mughal India also employed their 
capital to earn Interest. The two prominent merchants of Gujarat 
in the seventeenth century, Santldas and Virji Vora, offered loans 
5? 
to the merchants. In 1658, the house of Santidas was ordered to 
be paid 5.43 lakhs by Murad on account of the debt the prince 
53 
owed to it. Virji Vora was also found buying bullion from the 
54 
English, which was purely a sarraf's business. But these indivi-
dual credit transactions of the big merchants were incidental 
and remained a bye product of their business of trading. It 
55 
appears from a report of the English factors that their sway 
in the money market was the outcome of their dominant financial 
position rather than their actual participation in credit 
business. Virji Vora lent large sums of money to the English 
51. Factories, 1634-36, p. 226; Factories (NS), 1670-77, p.239, 
52. Factories, 1624-29, p. 215; 1630-33, p. 56. 
53. Mirat-i-Ahmadr, 1, pp. 238-89. 
54. F a c t o r i e s , 1630-33, pp. 262-3. 
55. F a c t o r i e s , 1637-41, p . 225. 
:: 15 : : 
56 
mainly to utilize idle capital or transfer money. Even when he 
wished to be paid at the same place, he contrived to charge an 
57 
additional amount for 'exchange'. At times, the interest charged 
by Virjl Vora seems to have been much higher than the ILsual 
5C 
market rate, and sometimes he appeared exceptionally close-fisted 
to the English merchants when they failed to procure any money 
59 
from him at any rate. 
Moreland has suggested that Virjl Vora accepted deposits, 
60 
and has also ascribed banking functions to him. There is, however, 
no evidence that he or other such merchants accepted deposits 
or performed banking functions. In fact, it appears that they 
61 
never wanted their capital to remain locked up in the market. 
56. Factories, 1630-33, p. 56; 1642-45, p.5. 
57. Factories, 1646-50, p. 308. 
58. Factories, 1642-45, p. 140; 1655-60, pp. 368-9. 
59. Factories, 1655-60, pp. 215, 360. 
60. Moreland, From Akbar to Aurangzeb, A Study in Indian Economic 
History, 1923.p. 158. 
61. Factories, 1668-69, p. 184. 
Chapter II 
THE BANKING 'FIRM' 
Besides the garrafs and the brokers, there were other 
people who undertook functions close to those of a banker. They 
were variously styled as mahajans, sahukars, sahus and sahs. 
The Sanskrit term mahajan, which literally means 'great 
person', has come to connote a merchant banker in modern 
writings. The mahajan, to judge from references in a Persian 
source of seventeenth century Rajasthan, was basically a grain 
merchant, who, since he was also a money-lender and accepted 
3 4 
securities, sometimes traded in certain other commodities. When 
1. H.H. Wilson, A Glossary of Judicial and Revenue Terms, 
London, 1855, p. 317; Hobson-Jobson, Yule and Burnell 
Delhi, 1986, p. 536; Jain, Indigenous ^ Banking in Incfla, 
1929, p. 39. For mahajan as a money changer, see Hidayatul 
Qawaid, Hidayatullah Bihari, I.O. Ms., 3996 A, f. 14. 
cited in Habib, 'Usury In Medieval India, p. 19. For the 
sense of a committee of leading men given to the term, 
see Factories, 1668-69, p. 192; Habib, 'Merchant Communi-
ties in Pre-Colonial India, op. cit., p. 18; Ashin Das 
Gupta, Indian Merchants and the Decline of Surat, C.170Q-
1750, Weisbaden, 1979, pp. 86-87; Dwijendra Trlpathl and 
M.J. Mehta, 'Class Character of the Business Community', 
in D. Tripathi ed. Business Communities of India, A His-
torical Perspective, New Delhi, 1984, p. 159. 
2. waqai., pp. 122, 326. 
3. Ibid., pp. 219, 249, 485-86. 
4. Ibid., pp. 219, 420. 
17 
the mahajans of Merta were imprisoned by a zamlndar, this caused 
5 
a scarcity of grain In the market. Clearly, this meant that 
they were engaged in grain trade. But they were not merely 
6 
traders, and also engaged in lending money to the peasants and 
upper rural strata on interest. Habib has shown from a specimen 
document of a seventeenth century accounting manual, how a 
7 
village was collectively indebteo to a mahajan. Even the 
zemindars and mansabdars had to depend quite often on the 
mahajans to meet their obligations. The mahajans ususally gave 
loans on the strength of the jaglrs assigned to the mansab-
o 
aars . Prlthi Singh, a mansabdar from Merta, was found borrow-
ing Rs. 150 per day from a mahajan to a total of Rs. 20,000 in 
_ 9 
anticipation of obtaining a jaglr. In another instance, on a 
complaint by the t"abirian (contingent) for their salary claims 
(talab) due on the mansabdar under whom they were serving, the 
latter's wakil pleaded that due to the shortage in his jaglrs 
and owing to calamities affecting his revenues in such as he 
held, his client had not been able to meet the demands. Had he 
5. Ibid., pp. 122, 127. 
6. Hirat-i-Al;imadi, I, pp. 240-1, where they are mentioned 
alongwlth the traders (beoparian). 
7. Siyaq Nama (1694-96), Nand Ram, 1879, pp. 77-9 cited in 
Irfan Habib, 'Usury in Medieval India', op.cit., p.394. 
8. Waqal, pp. 49-50. 
9. Ibid., pp. 152-3, 170, 276. 
18 
had his (full?) jagir the mahajans would at least have given 
10 
him something by way of loan. 
Studies in Rajasthani records have brought out the 
11 
mahajan's character as trader and money-lender. It seems that 
in eastern Rajasthan they were popularly known as bohras. They 
operated in rural marts (mandis), stood as guarantors (mil jamin) 
12 
to the ijaradars, and advanced loans on behalf of the state. 
They belonged to a prfessional community which transcended caste 
13 
barriers. A recent study of the eastern Rajasthan in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth century, however, treats mahajans, 
and bohras as 'two distinct though similar professional groups'. 
The latter, also called sahukar or sahu, issued and discounted 
14 hundis, besides lending money. 
10. I b i d . , p . 413. 
1 1 . B .L . G u p t a , Trade and Commerce i n R a j a s t h a n , J a i p u r , 1987, 
p p . 2 2 , 3 0 . 
12. D i l b a g h S ingh , 'The Role of Mahajans in t he Rura l Economy 
of E a s t e r n R a j a s t h a n d u r i n g t h e E i g h t e e n t h C e n t u r y ' , S o c i a l 
S c i e n t i s t , D e l h i , May, 1974, pp. 2 0 - 3 . 
13. Ibid. 
14. S.P. Gupta, Agrarian System of Eastern Rajasthan (c.l650-
1750), Delhi 1986, pp. 1403; also see Habib, 'Merchant 
Communities' p. 21n. 
19 
It seems that in the eighteenth century Bengal, the 
mahajans primarily carried on money-lending for there the term 
15 
mahajani had come to be used for the business of money lending. 
The mahajans, described in Buchanan's survey of eastern 
India in early nineteen*-h century, appear predominantly to be 
merchants dealing in grain and other merchandise, but also 
16 
engaged in usury. A group of 'Rokari' or 'Naqadi' ('Nukudi') 
mahajans were exclusively money lenders and advanced commercial 
credit. 
As with the garra^ f , It is difficult to ascertain when and 
how did the mahajan take to money lending. An important feature 
of the mahajan's activities was acceptance of deposits. These 
deposits came from both merchants and Mughal officials. The 
mahajans of Ajmer once reported in the 22nd regnal year of 
Aurangzeb, that the faujdar and amin of Ajmer province had 
15. Risalai Zlra'at, Ms Edinburgh Ihh, ff. 106-lla cited.in 
Irfan Habib, 'Usury in Medieval India', op.cit. , p.395. 
16. F. Buchanan, An Account of the district of Shahabad in 
1812-13, Patna, 1934, pp. 430-32; An Account of the Dis-
trict of Purnea in 1809-10, Patna, 1928, pp. 577, 579; An 
Account of the Districts of Bihar and Patna in 1811-12, 
II, Patna, 1934, pp. 683, 684-85. 
17. F. Buchanan, An Account of the District of Purnea, op.cit. 
p.584; An Account of the Districts of Bihar and Patna, 
op.cit. , p. 699. 
20 
18 
deposited twenty thousand rupees with the mahajans of Merta.. 
Another incident reported In the 21st regnal year refers to the 
claims of a baniya (baqqal) over three mahajans of Jodhpur, for 
cash and goods worth rupees one thousand deposited ten years 
ID 
ago. While there is no mention of interest, there is little 
doubt that the mahajans accepted deposits on interest. Hence, 
one finds the revenue officials of Aurangzeb depositing state 
revenue with the mahajans for private gain, instead of sending 
it to the royal treasury. Both(he amin and karori are reported 
in one instance to have been working in connivance with the 
fotadar (treasurer) since long for this purpose, maintaining 
20 
false accounts of the money actually realized in revenue. It 
seems that such a practice had precedent, for there are instruc-
tions in the Aln-i-Akbari to the fotadar not to indulge in 
2-i 
usury. 
Such deposits combined with mahajan's own capital to 
finance their usurious and mercantile operations. 
18. Waqai, pp. 319-20. 
19. Ibid., pp. 29-30. 
20. Ibid., pp. 27, 32. 
21. Ain-i-Akbari, Abul Fazl, ed. Blochman, Asiatic Society of 
Bengal, 1876, 1, p. 289. 
21 :: 
The term sahukar, sahu and sah, interchangeable in seven-
22 23 
teenth century literature, also stand now for merchant bankers. 
The sah in the fourteenth century appears as a merchant usurer, 
and was counted among the monied men of the Delhi Sultanate. In 
an early seventeenth century biographical work, the Sahu" or Sah 
always appears as the designation of a big merchant, sometimes 
2 5 
served by the merchant biographer Banarsidas himself. Santidas 
of Ahmedabad who was a jeweller and merchant of repute, has been 
26 
counted one among the reputed sahus of Gujarat, The English 
22. For the term Sahukar and Sahu as one see Akhbarat-i-Darbar 
i-Mualla, 46th regnal year (Royal Asiatic Society Library 
London, case 47, 46/25) cited in Irfan Habib, 'Usury in 
Medieval India', pp. 408-9* Sometimes the term mahajan and 
sahukar or sahu were used to designate the same profes-
sional group; See Waqa'i, p. 293; also Buchanan, The Account 
of the Districts of Shahabad, op. cit., p. 436 for 'Sau 
Mahajan' ' ... The people here called Mahajans (Mahajun), 
Sahu and Baheriyas, live by lending money'. Buchanan 
Hamilton, E. India, ii, 573, cited in Hobson- Jobson, op. 
cit., p. 866. 
23. Hobson-Jobson, op.cit., p. 856, S.V. 'SOWCAR' also p.816, 
s.v. 'SHA', Wilson, op.cit., p. 453; Jain op.cit., p.21n; 
the Variants are from a Sanskrit compound Sadhukar, 'right 
doer'. 
24. Tarfkb i Firoz ShahJ, Barani, op.cit., pp. 141 233-34; 
Irfan Habib, CEHI, 1, pp. 85-86. 
25. Ardhakathanak, op.cit., pp. 250, 266. 
26. Mira't-i-Ahmadi, 1, pp. 238-39, 240. 
22 
Inform us about them while writing about the sarrafs : "These 
people follow he great ones, as the herd their leader; for 
Santidas or Miah (Miyan) saw, or any of the great Sawes (Hind. 
Sah, a banker) keep up their monies, all the rest must imitate 
them, though they know not their own reason".' The English have 
28 
sometimes used the term 'Shawe' for ^arrafs as well. 
It would, thus, seem that the sahukars were also merchants 
2 9 _ _ 
and money Iti.ders. A notable feature of the sahukar or sahu' s 
trade was the carrying of operations at distant places through 
his factors (gumashta, beoparl, banjara), whose services he 
30 
probably secured through advancing them some capital. 
27. Factories, 1537-41, pp. 225. 
28. Factories, 1618-19, pp. 91, 247-48; See Van Santen p.31 
for the Dutch factors calling Santidas a 'money changer' 
('geldwiselaar'). It was perhaps imperative for a 
merchant to learn the elementary principals of money chang-
ing. Ardhakathanaka. op.clt., p.227. 
29. See Irfan Habib, 'Usury in Medieval India'', pp. 408-9, for 
sahukars refusing to grant interest free loans to Emperor 
Aurangzeb lest the governors claim similar privilege to 
the detriment of the sahs. 
30. Waqai, p. 293; Irfan Habib, 'Usury in Medieval India', 
p. 400; 'Merchant Commulnltles', pp. 6, 10. 
23 
Hence, both the mahajans and the sahuka'rs in the seven-
teenth century appear to be merchants engaged in usury. The 
sahukars appear in the literature of eighteenth and nineteenth 
century mainly as bill-discounters. A large number of merchants 
31 
were styled Sah ('Sah') in seventeenth century Bengal, and in 
the early eighteenth century we find that all the bills of the 
Surman mission were drawn on the 'Sahu beoparl' ('Sawbeparry') at 
32 
Calcutta. Malcolm, writing of Central India in 1824 gives a 
vivid description of the banking activities of the sahukars : 
•'There is at present, and has always been in Central India, 
a great traffic in bills of exchange. An amount of from two to 
three lacs monthly is drawn from Mhow and Indore, in bills on the 
treasuries of the western provinces of Hindustan; and there can 
be no doubt that nearly double that sum may be negotiated at a 
favourable rate of exchange at the cities of Oojein and Indore 
alone. But the bankers, or their agents, who purchase these 
bills, do it merely to sell them again : indeed they seldom ask 
for them, till they have settled the distribution among the 
different shroffs; or money broker, in small sums, of the amount 
for which they apply; or when induced by accounts of the rate of 
id them on speculation 
jeypc 
exchange, which they daily receive, to senc 
for sale to Kotah or i poor". 
31. Master, I, p. 112, II, pp. 306-8, 336-7; Malda Diary, 
op .cit., p. 80. 
32. Annals vol. II, pt. II, The Surman Embassy, pp.303-4. 
33. Malcom, A Memoir of Central India, vol. II, 1832 p. 88 and 
n. In Europe, during this period, specialist arbitrageurs 
watched the fluctuations in the bills of exchange to buy 
and sell bills, taking advantage of temporary discrepen-
cies. Jacob M. Price, Transaction costs : A Note in 
Merchant Credit and the Organization of Private Trade 
(Preliminary Version, duplicated) p. 12. 
24 
Malcolm also informs us that the bankers of Ujjaln and 
Indore were often the channel of payment for the Bengal merchan-
34 
dlse coming to Gujarat. Regarding book credit ('accomodation 
bills', or 'Oant'), he writes : 
"These are termed on the face of the bills 'Chelaun', or 
current in opposition to 'Rokra' or ready money bills. The 
person who accepts these from the drawers, enters the amount 
against him in his booics at interest, which it continues to bear 
and be transferable, but without giving a right to any holder 
to enforce payment. It is a kind of floating credit introduced 
by a body of individuals, by mutual understanding, to supply 
the place of capital, but when that abounds, it falls to the 
ground, being unreal. The dealings in this species of bill 
currency are limited to soucars and money brokers". 
Though the sahukars seemed to have excelled the sarrafs 
in banking in the nineteenth century, at least for Mughal India 
one could say with certainty that it was the sarrafs who were 
the actual deposit bankers. The fate of the money and credit 
market largely depended on the availability of deposits with the 
sarrafs who worked in a state of 'perfect competition'. The 
fluctuation in the rates of the bills of exchange were engendered 
by the state of banking capital at any place. In 1621, Muqarrab 
34. Ibid., pp. 89-90. 
35. Ibid., p. 91n. Also see Hobson-Jobson, p. 856, for refer-
ences cited therein of 1803 and 1826. "You should not 
confine your dealings to one soucar. Open a communication 
with every soucar in Poonah and take money from any man 
who will give it you for bills" - Wellington, Desp., ed. 
1837, 1; "We are also Sahoukars, and granted bills of 
exchange upon Bombay and Madras, and we advanced money 
upon interest", Pandurang Hari, 174; (1973, i, 251). 
25 
Khan, the Mughal governor at Patna, deposited a sum of 8 lakhs 
with the sarrafs, which caused a fall in the rate of bills of 
36 
exchange. Besides, the scarcity or abundance of banking capital 
also affected availability of bill credit. The English reported 
time and again that the scarcity of capital induced the sarrafs 
to discount bills rather than advance loans. We know from a 
reference in the Mirat-i-Ahmadl that the general scarcity of 
coined money had led the sarrafs to redeem bills by bills, and 
38 
to charge discount (anth) on cash payment. 
The importance of the sarrafs in trade was well realized 
by the English Factors. While assessing the impact of the 
oppressive conduct of a qazi of Surat in 1669 they wrote : 
"For most of the sheroffs and moneyed men doe think of calling 
(in?) their stocks and (and according to the custome of this 
country) burying the greatest part underground; so the bulk of 
trade, which is maintained and carried on chiefly on credit, must 
necessarily fall".-
These aspects of deposit banking suggest a particular 
level of circulation of money in the Mughal Empire, which Induced 
merchants, officials and ordinary people to deposit money with 
36. Factories, 1618-21, pp. 236-2-^8. 
37. Factories, 1618-21, p. 91; 1655-60, pp. 18-19; Annals, 
III, 376. 
38. Mira"t-i-Ahmadi, op.cit., p. All. Also Malcolm, op.clt. , 
pp. 90-91 and n. 
39. Factories, 1668-69, pp. 197-8. 
26 
the bankers. It also suggests a developed mercantile economy 
which created increased demand for commercial credit. During 
this period, one hardly finds a professional money lender whose 
interest bearing capital was self generated. The sarrafs, 
merchant usurers, and the brokers, all accumulated capital 
through other means besides money lending. There was apparently 
no dearth of individual wealth, and one reads of astonishing 
amounts of the wealth of nobles and merchants. The merchants 
and bankers, therefore, were naturally vulnerable to extortion. 
There was, however, little effort towards combining the 
large isolated pockets of wealth. Particularly in the sphere 
of banking, one finds that the banker usually acted Independently 
with the help of his agents, sometimes his family members. We 
know from our seventeenth century evidence that major trading 
towns of the Mughal Empire were connected with the transaction 
40. Pelsaert, The Remonstrantie of Fransisco Pelsaert, c.1626 
tr. Jahangir's India by W.H. Moreland and P. Geyl, Delhi, 
1972, pp. 54-55; Mandelslo, Mandelslos' Travels in Western 
India (1638-39), M.S. Commissariat, London, 1931, p. 31; 
Manrique, Travels of Fray Sebastian Manrlque, 1629-1643 
tr. C.E. Luard, Haklyut Society, London, 1927, vol. 1, 
p.44; Thevenot, Indian Travels of Thavenot and Careri ed. 
S.N. Sen, New Delhi, 1949, p. 22; Norris, The Norrls 
Embassy of aurangzeb (1669-1702), Harihardas and S.L. 
Sarkar, Calcutta, 1959, pp. 267, 285. 
41. Ardhakathanak, op.cit., p. 259; Thevenot, op.cit., p. 135; 
Factories, 1655-60, p. 123; 1668-69 pp. 195-98; Moreland 
From Akbar to Aurangzeb, op.cit., p. 158; Waqai op.cit., 
pp. 314, 427-8, 437; Factories, 1661-64, p. 303. 
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in bills of exchange. Tavernier lists the towns from where the 
42 
merchants seeking credit drew bills upon Surat. It was obviously 
necessary for a sarraf to have agents and branches at different 
43 
places. It is, however, not clear whether a single sarraf had 
to have his branches spread at various places, or whether he 
could work in patnership with other sarrafs of different 
regions. In 1616, the English factors were sending bills of 
exchange from Surat, to be first passed on to certain sarrafs at 
Burhanpur and then 'to be recharged on others' at Agra. In 
1630, the English at Surat were remitting money to Agra through 
45 
Ahmedabad by means of bills. It is possible here that this dual-
transaction was necessitated by the absence of any factor of 
their Surat sarraf at Agra. 
We also have evidence for a single firm with many branches. 
In 1717, the firm of 'Kissory Kissen Chand' was discounting bills 
42. Tavernier, op.cit., I, pp. 30-32; Pelseart, op.cit., p.38. 
43. Khulasatut Twarlkh, op.cit., p. 25. 
44. Supplementary Calender, op.cit., p. 89. 
45. Factories, 1630-33, p. 96. 
45a. Tavernier, 1, p.31. Tavernier has mentioned that bills of 
exchange at Decca, Patna and Benares were not directly 
given on Surat, but on Agra first and from there to Surat. 
28 
46 
of Suraman mission at Delhi and Allahabad. It seems that Kishorl 
Kishan Chand carried on his activities from Agra, where he 
himself discounted a bill of the English, with the help of his 
47 
factors at Delhi and Allahabad. From the figures we have for a 
period of less than six months, it appears that Rs. 63,000 were 
borrowed by the English from this firm. All the bills drawn by 
the English were in favour of one 'Sawe biparry' at Calcutta. 
We do not really know whether 'Sahu Beoparl' v;aD an independent 
banker with whom the'firm of Kishorl Kishan Chand had a corres-
pondence or was a banker to the English, who effected repayments 
of their debts. The English also drew a bill on 'Sahu Beoparl' 
49 
from Patna, discounted by one Balchand. Another bill of Rs.5,000 
drawn at Patna and discounted by Gokuldas Khushal Rai, was paya-
50 
ble to Kishori Gulal Chand in Bengal, who seemed to have headed 
another banking firm with its headquarter at Patna, and branches 
at Delhi and in Bengal. The English were drawing bills at Delhi 
and Patna to raise money, which were discounted by Gulal Chand 
Sahu and his factors. Some of these bills were payable to 'Sahu 
Beoparl' at Calcutta, with whom like Kishori Chand, Gulal Chand 
46. Annals, II part II, pp. 237-38, 268, 292, 297, 
47. Ibid. , pp. 286-87, 288. 
48. Ibid. , pp. 230-1, 237-8, 268, 286-7, 292, 297. 
49. Ibid. , pp. 303-4. 
50. Ibid., pp. 303-4. 
51. Ibid., pp. 87, 301. 
29 
52 
was also presumably having a correspondence. In one Instance, 
the bills which Gulal Chand discounted at Patna, was bought by 
'Monick Chand Saw', who received the amount from the English at a 
53 
discount of 2 percent. 
While very little «^ known about Kishori Kishan Chand and 
his antecedents, 'Deccany Ray' a factor of Kishan Chand, seems 
to have been working as a deposit banker for the Surman mission. 
The English styled him, 'ShropH (s'arraf) and had deposited 
Rs. 600 with him for the payment of the salary of their agent at 
54-
the royal court. 
The latter half of the seventeenth century and the 
eighteenth century witnessed the emergence of certain big banking 
houses. The banking houses of Jagat Seth Manik Chand in Bengal 
and of Dixit Patwardhan at Poona are particularly noteworthy. 
52. Ibid., pp. 272-73, 
53. Ibid. , p. 301. 
54. Ibid. , pp. 282-83. Another report mentions that the money 
was deposited with Gulal Chand Sahil 3 factors, ibid. ,p.276. 
55. J.H. Little, The House of Jagat Seth, Calcutta 1967; G.T. 
Kulkarni, 'Banking in 18th c. A case Study of a Poona 
Banker', Proceedings of the Seminar on the * Transformation 
of the Medieval Indian Economy into Colonial Economy',' 
Aligarh 1972 duplicated). 
30 
The wisespread use of bills of exchange and the ability 
of the Mughal Indian bankers to maintain and regulate the flow 
of cash between the places involved in transactions in commercial 
paper owed also to the organisation of adequate information 
services. The bankers needed current information about the 
fluctuations in the exchange rates and the state of commercial 
capital at different places. Advices regarding the bills dis-
56 
counted and honoured had also to be transmitted to other places. 
From the correspondence of the Surman mission of the 
English company, one gets an idea of the working of this system. 
The Surman mission had placed a person 'Miter Sein' as their 
agent ('Vaaqueel') In the court of Farrukhsiyar at Delhi, whose 
business was to transmit the 'Durbar news'. An arrangement was 
made by the English so that the letters addressed to this agent 
could reach his hands, delivered through 'Golal Chand Sahs' 
factory In Bengal. The agent was ordered to employ the same 
channel of communication for send his letters to Bengal. The 
English report that they had also made similar arrangements with 
56. Within Europe, newspapers and specialized publications 
kept track of the daily fluctuations in rates of exchange 
between major centres. Jacob M. Price, op.clt., p.12. 
57. Annals vol. II, pt. II, op.cit., pp. 276, 282-3, 292. 
31 
58 
another 'Shroff (Sarraf) to communicate with Surat. In order 
to communicate with Bombay, the services of 'Klssendass Bullinaut 
50 
Shrofs' were employed.'' Such link with Madras appeared difficult 
in view of the 'very little correspondence' existing between 
Delhi and Madras^^ 
The English in the beginning employed their own couriers 
to despatch news. Even in the early eighteenth century they 
had their own 'Cossid' (qasid^courier). When they came to terms 
with the banking firms for loans, they seemed to have started 
availing of their information services. Besides Gulalchand 
Sahus', they sent letters from Delhi to Bengal through 'Murlldur 
Bawseen Decanny Ray's' (Murlidhar Bhavsen Dakhini Rai) 'factory', 
which belonged to Kishori Kishan Chanc id. 
58. Ibid., p. 276. 
59. Ibid., pp. 282-3, 
60. Ibid., p. 272. 
51. Irfan Habib, 'Postal Communication in Mughal India', PIHC, 
Amritsar, 1986, p. 247. 
62. Ibid., pp. 282-83. 
32 
It seems that these firms offered the services of their 
couriers to the English without charging anything from them. 
The only mention of an additional 'expence', incurred on such 
communication, allowed to the agent at the court of Delhi, comes 
when he was advised to use special couriers ('dawk') in cases 
of urgent necessity. 
Though this picture is largely restricted to the extent 
of the system being used by the English, there is other evidence 
too that the bankers ran an organised network of commercial 
64 
Intelligence which also transmitted sundry information. 
The deposit bankers generally kept their dealings fairly 
65 
straight. One, however, does come across incidents of bankruptcy 
66 
and loss of credit worthiness. The English sent a report to Agra 
63. Ibid. 
64. Waqai op.cit., p. 323; Malcolm, op.cit., pp. 88-9 about 
the bankers of central India receiving dally information 
about the rate of exchange of bills from Kota and Jaipur, 
For the organised Information network of the fifteenth 
century Venetian and Genoese commercial and banking firms 
see Ellyahu Ashtor, Levant Trade in the Later Middle Ages, 
Princeton, 1983, pp. 379-80. 
65. Khu-tafat ut Twarlkh, p. 25. 
i 
66. Factories, 1642-45, p. 303; waqai, pp. 29-30. 
33 
informing the bankruptcy of a sarr^f at Patna when the latter had 
to honour a bill of Rs. 100,000, owing to the proceedings of 
his father at Agra. During this period the English were con-
tinuously remitting money from Agra to Patna, and the report was 
sent presumably to warn the English at Agra not to use the agency 
_ 67 
of the bankrupt Sarraf. 
Manucci narrates an interesting episode of an Armenian 
merchant of Agra who carried a bill of exchange for 25,000 rupees 
to Patna. On learning that the Patna ^arraf had become bankrupt, 
the merchant bought goods upto 30,000 Rs. worth and delivered to 
Surat. On the eve of payment, 'in pursuance of the custom of 
the Country', he lighted two candles in the morning before his 
house and declared himself 'Divalia' (bankrupt). When the 
creditor merchants carried him to the Court, he produced the bill 
of exchange and stated the cause of his non-payment. The Judge 
decreed that the merchants should 'take the bill of exchange and 
procure payment for themselves, being fellow citizens of the 
Sarraf, for it was 'unreasonable that a stranger should suffer 
in a foreign country'. Manucci, however, says that the Armeanian 
/TO 
bribed the Judge in order to obtain his claim. 
67. Temple, p. 368 
68. Manucci, op.cit., II, pp. 77-78. 
CHAPTER - III 
BILLS OF EXCHANGE 
1. The hundi : 
The species of paper in Mughal India, which constituted 
most of the credit money was the hundf. Despite Its early 
origins, it answered almost all the descriptions of a modern bill 
2 • 
of exchange. It carried a statement in 'Hindi', promising pay-
men t of a specified sum of demand at a particular place, within 
3 
or after a stipulated time mentioned therein. A treatment of 
The Indian name 'hundi' or 'hundwi' is given in Akbar Nama, 
III, p. 762; Bahar-i Ajam, Munshl Tek ;Chand .Bahar, • A.D. 
1739-'!i0, Naual Kishore, 1916, II, p. 498 s.v. 'hundwi'. 
Also see documents cited In S.P. Gupta, 'Money-lending and 
Banking in Eastern Rajasthan during the 17th and 18th 
Century', paper read in the Indian History Congress, 
Srinagar, 1986 duplicated), and B.L. Gupta, Trade and 
Commerce in Rajasthan, 1987, pp. 15-16. 158. The term 
^ hundi" is obviously from 'hundtka' (Sanskrit) _whose 
earliest usage goes back to 914 A.D., Rajataranginl, ed. 
Stein, Bombay, 1892; trans, by him, Westminster, 1900, V, 
266, 275, 302. 
For the equivalent Persian term sufta for bill of 
exchange see Mlrat-i Ahmadl, p. 411 and Bahar-i Ajam, op. 
clt. It comes from Arabic £.'uftaja, the credit instrument 
of medieval Arab economy. (E. Ashtor, A Social and Econo-
mics History of the Near East in the Middle Ages, op.clt., 
pp. 144-5; F. Braudel, op.cit., II, 817). 
A modern dictionary defines the bill of exchange as a 
"written order by the writer or 'drawer' to the 'drawee' 
(the person to whom it is addressed) to pay a certain sum 
on a given date to the 'drawer' or to a third person named 
In the bill known as the payee". Oxford English Diction-
ary, Oxford, 1933, 1, pp. 860, s.v. bill of exchange. 
3. Khulasat-ut Tawarikh, p.25* Master, II, p. 481 
35 
the system of bills of exchange In Mughal India already exists 
4 
in two papers of Irfan Habib. But a detailed survey of evidence 
enables one to add to what he has said and explore some neglected 
avenues. 
2. Forms And Functions : 
Long before inland bills were made legal in England, in 
5 
1697, different forms of bills of exchange or hundis were per-
forming a variety of functions in the credit market in Mughal 
India. One type of hundi. typically medieval in character, 
functioned as a mode of money transfers from one place to the 
other. A person, in order to avoid the risks of carrying cash, 
deposited it with a sarraf and obtained a hundi instead. It was 
A. Irfan Habib, 'Banking in Mughal India', pp. 1-20; 'Bills 
of Exchange' pp. 290-303. 
5. Thompson, op.cit., pp. 77-80. The earliest reference to 
the bills of exchange in Western Europe are those of 
twelveth century Florentine, thirteenth century Venice and 
late fourteenth century England. Thompson, op.cit., pp. 
77-80. 
6. Akbar Nama, III p. 762; Khulasat-ut Tawarikh, p. 25, Mirat-
i AhmadI, pp. 410-11. The passages relating to hundi have 
been translated in Habib, 'Bills of Exchange', pp.291-2, 
299. Also see mandelslo, op.cit., pp. 27-8. 
7. A class of people specializing in such papers. See Habib, 
'Banking in Mughal India', pp. 8-9 and passim: 'Merchant 
Communities', pp. 31-5. 
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honoured by the sarrafs agents (gumashtaha), who had their shops 
o 
at various places in the empire. The hundi was carried to the 
9 
destined place either by the person himself, In which case it 
paralleled the travellers' cheques of modern times, or by a 
messenger (qasid), in case the amount was simply to be remitted 
to his counterpart. 
The English factors trading in India largely remitted 
money through hundis in order to supply adequate capital to their 
11 
factories for investments. The ledger of an Armenian merchant 
8. Khulasat-ut Twarikh, p. 25, Tavernier, I, p.24. Probably 
Tavernier was using the term 'Cheraf' both for the garrafs 
and their agents. Mandelslo extends the area of sarrafs 
operation far beyond Asia. Mandelslo, op.cit., pp. 27-8. 
There is no way of knowing under what conditions these 
agents operated and what commission did they charge for 
handling bills of exchange. 
9. Factories 1618-21, p. 191. 
10. Factories, 1618-21, pp. 247-48; 1622-23, p. 31. They were 
also called bazar qasid and were a class of people carry-
ing this particular business. Temple, I, p.368. 
11. Pelsaert op.cit., p.38, Supplementary Caldender, op.cit., 
p.89; Factories (NS), 1678-84, pp. 253-54; S. Najaf Haider, 
'English Merchants and the Credit Market of India in the 
seventeenth century', PIHC, 1987, pp. 295-96. 
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furnishes interesting information on commercial transactions 
a 12 
through such/medium. It appears that the Armenian merchants 
often travelled with little cash in their hands, while keeping 
their main capital in circulation, transferring it from one place 
to another through the hundl ('yendvl'). 
The remittance of the state's resources to the central ex-
chequer and from the latter to treasuries throughout the e.npire 
was also affected through hundls. The hundl facilitated the 
remittance of even sums as small as 50 rupees to 3 lakhs sent 
16 
by Akbar to Deccan. 
The bill functioned purely as a credit instrument when a 
short-term loan was raised against it. Tavernier states the 
conditions under which such hundls were drawn by the merchants 
12. Khachikian, pp. 153-56. Hovhannes traded in India from 
1682 to 1693 on behalf of his master (agha) under commenda 
contract making detailed entries in hls~ledger (roozlima), 
in accordance with the code of law of the Astarkhan 
Armenians. 
13. Ibid., pp. 173-74, 'Yendvi' is obviously Armenian corrup-
tion of 'Hundwl' or 'Hindu/x'. 
14. Habib, op.cit., p. 301; also Moreland, Akbar to Aurangzeb, 
A study In Indian Economic History, Delhi 1972, pp.270-1. 
15. Khachikian, p. 174. The merchant Banarsi Das was drawing a 
hundl for Rs. 500 at Jaunpur to purchase cloth, Ardhaka-
thanaka, op.cit.. p. 261, verse 494. 
16. Akbar Nama, III p. 762, 
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and discounted by the sarrafs. Besides remitting money, as we 
have seen, the English merchants also financed their capital-
starved establishments by drawing bills which the sarrafs dis-
IC , , 
counted. At time too they borrowed money from agents ot 
established merchant money-lenders, giving bills of exchange 
19 
for both the principal and interest. On certain occasions, the 
English merchants themselves assumed a position analoguous to 
- 20 
the sarrafs by discounting merchants' hundis. In 1680, when the 
Bombay treasury was in good funds, they lent money to the Mughal 
admiral, Sidi Qasim, on bills payable at Surat, making a gain of 
12% (2%?).^*^ 
Members of the Mughal ruling class also discounted 
22 
merchants' bills and extended loans. In 1633, Peter Mundy took 
up money at Jalore by obtaining a bill of 160 mutjrs from the 
- — 23 
treasurer of Baqlr Khan, the Subedar of Gujarat. Presuming that 
17. Tavernier, I pp. 30-2 cited in Habib, 'Banking in Mughal 
India', pp. 11-12. 
18. Factories 1618-21, pp 236, 2^0; Factories (NS), 1678-84, 
pp. 253-4; Annals, III, p. 253. 
19. Factories 1634-36, pp. 115-6. 
20. Ibid. , p. 169. 
21. Factories (NS) 1678-84, pp. 74-75, 115. 
22. Mundy, op.cit., pp. 282-83. 
23. Ibid., p. 290. 
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Mundy must have given a bill to obtain another, it would serve 
as an example of a bill drawn against another. We have instances 
where credit bills were drawn to redeem other bills due on the 
24 
drawer. 
An interesting aspect of these transactions was the sale-
ability of the bill in the open market. Since the bill did not 
normally specify the possessor, it could be sold at a small 
25 
discount, which accounted for the gain of the buyer for putting 
his capital In the market till the date of actual redemption. 
In case the buyer was a creditor, the hundi for remittance 
was converted into an ancillary instrument of credit, satisfying 
the debt of the seller. In this process there was no transfor-
mation of the bill into actual coin. 
24. Hablb, 'Bills of Exchange' p. 298. 
25. Khula"sat-ut Twarikh, p. 25; Factories 1668-69, p. 177. It 
appears that no formal endorsement was required before the 
hundi became negotiable, and the obligation of payment was 
governed by customary law. (Habib, op.cit., p. 242). There 
is no evidence to suggest that the agency of the sarrafs 
performed the functions of an 'Accepting House'. 
26. Mirat-I Ahmadl, pp. 410-11. 
27. Ibid. 
:: 40 : : 
Such a form of credit, emerging out of the negotiability 
of the bills, was a fundamental pre-requisite for the development 
of merchants capital, where liquidity of capital is imperative. 
While credit was raised, the capital was never locked up and 
remained in circulation. 
Essential to the operation of such commercial credit was 
the prevalence of ethical proprieties which struck contemporary 
28 
Persian chroniclers. In case of non-redemption of a bill, the 
29 
claim of the purchaser was always protected by the customary laws. 
Although the English merchants, while advancing such a claim, 
sometimes stooped to coercive methods^, they themselves acknow-
31 
ledged the strength of indigenous customs. The sarrafs charged 
5% compensation from the drawer when the bill was dis-honoured, 
32 besides the amount due. This probably accounted for the high 
rates of interest charged on the principal for the stipulated 
period, as well as the cost of travel of the sarrafs' messengers. 
28. Khulasat-ut Twarikh, p. 25; Akbar Nama III p. 762. 
29. Factories 1668-69, p. 177. Manucci op.cit., II,pp.77-8, 
30. Factories 1622-23, p. 116. 
31. Factories 1668-69, p. 177. 
32. Factories 1655-60, p. 363. 
41 
There were occasions where a single bill probably 
performed both the functions of raising credit and making 
remittance at the same time. In 1617, the Surat factors were 
33 
remitting money to Broach through bills obtained on credit. 
Almost a century later, the Bengal factors made a remittance to 
satisfy the debts of their Patna factors. The bill wa^ drawn on 
credit by their broker, Varanasi Seth, on Ranijawan Das and 
Yogajlvan Das of Patna. The repayment was subsequently made at 
3A 
the place of issue. 
of 
Yet another important use/the hundi was as a medium of 
payment In commercial transactions. We have seen that in the 
Deccan the purchasers of diamonds concluded the transactions by 
drawing bills on the sarrafs?. A letter of the Patna factors in 
1620 informs us that the local merchants bought everything they 
wanted by means of bills of exchange. There are numerous 
instances of the English factors paying for their transport cost 
or making purchases through bills of exchange drawn upon their 
33. Supplementary Calendar, op.cit., p. 120. 
34. Annals, III, p. 223. 
35. Tavernier, II, pp. 47-8. 
36. Temple, p. 368. 
:: 42 :: 
37 
factories. Shivaji too was fond of making payment to the 
38 
merchants in bills drawn upon his correspondents. 
There also existed a stream of bills drawn for various 
kind of payments by the members of the ruling class. On the eve 
of the War of succession, Prince Murad Bakhsh took up 5.43 lakhs 
of Rupees from the sons of Santl Das Sahu, a leading merchant 
of Ahmedabad, and other merchants, and issued an order (manshur) 
to the Subadar of Gujarat, Mutamid Khan, for the payment of the 
debt from out of the revenue of certain areas mentioned in the 
39 
order. This might not have involvd the discounting of a true 
bill; but Murads' brother. Shah Shuja, was found issuing bills of 
40 
debt to an English merchant for his goods. 
In this dealing with the Mughal noble, Shaista Khan, 
Tavernier preferred being paid in bills of exchange drawn on the 
nobles treasury, though he usually had trouble in getting full 
41 
redemption. In 1661, after selling his goods to Shaista Khan at 
37. Supplementary Calendar, oD.cit., p. 56; Factories 1622-23, 
p. 219. 
38. Factories (NS), 1680-84, pp. 148-9. 
39. For a copy of the manshur of Prince Murad Bakhsh see Mlrat-
1 A^madl, pp. 238-9. 
40. Factories 1668-69, p. 177. 
41. Tavernier, I, pp. 26-8, 106-7. 
43 
Dacca, Tavernier desired a bill of exchange payable at Kasim-
bazar, when the Dutch warned him of the risks of carrying silver 
to Kasimbazar. The dangers, according to them, consisted in the 
sailors deliberately .w-recking the boats to recover the silver 
hi 
later. On another occasion, when Tavernier was passing through 
a disturbed territory in the Deccan, he wished to be paid at 
Daulatabad instead of Surat. 
We know that the English factors availed of the free 
system of coinage in the Mughal mints, to get their bullion 
converted into specie^T In most cases it was the sarrafs who 
45 
bought their bullion and paid in ready money. But sometimes it 
46 
was sold to the members of the Mughal ruling class also. In 
such a transaction the English always favoured payment in bills 
of exchange to be sent to their factories in need of money. 
42. Ibid., pp. 106-7. 
43. Ibid., p. 325. 
44 Irfan Habib, 'Currency System of the Mughal Empire (1556-
1707)', Medieval India Quarterly, vol. IV, Aligarh, 1961, 
p. 3. 
45. Factories, 1634-36, pp. 68, 225; For similar information 
on Dutch merchants see Om Prakash 'Foreign Merchants and 
Mughal Mints', in J.F. Richards ed. Imperial Monetary 
System of Mughal India, Delhi^l987, pp. 171-92. 
46. Factories, 1618-21, p. 218. 
:: 44 : : 
47 
The bills were either drawn on the sarrafs or on the treasury. 
These official bills, whether they were drawn to advance 
loans or to make payments, were also negotiable. When Miindy took 
up a bill on Ahmedabad from the treasury of Baqar Khan, it was 
46 
discounted by a garraf at Jalore itself. We have similar evidence 
49 
of nobles bills selling at a small discount. 
In Seventeenth Century Maharashtra, salaries of officials 
were paid in 'Varats' (barat) or orders upon the treasury. A 
50 
modern writer has equated these with the bills of exchange. 
Shivaji frequently used 'Varats' to pay merchants for their goods. 
It seems that Shivaji, like the Mughal nobles, Issued both 
'Varats' and commercial bills of exchange to make payments to 
47. Factories, 1618-21, p. 308. 
48. Mundy p. 290. 
49. Factories, 1668-69, p. 177; Tavernier, I, pp. 21-8. 
50. A.R. Kulkarni, 'Banking In 17th, c. Maharashtra', PIHC, 
pp. 227-8. 
51. Factories (NS), 1678-84, 148-9. 
45 
merchants. Hence, it also appears that while 'Varats' or other 
32 
bills, operated within a political unit, commercial bills of 
exchange transcended political boundries. It is difficult to 
compu te the total valume of the state sponsored paper credit. 
Yet, keeping in view the fact that the §arrafs frequently 
54, 
discounted government bills, one could suggest that the private 
mechanism of the sarrafs was relatively fairly strong. 
At the risk of citing later evidence, one can consider the 
brisk traffic in bills of exchange in Central India, reported by 
Malcolm (1824), who estimated that a monthly amount of around two 
to three lakhs was drawn from Mhow and Indore in bills upon 
western provinces through the bankers and their agents, when 
55 
the former sent goods to Gujarat and the Deccan. The Gujarat 
52. See ibid., for the fact that he issued bills on Golconda 
which was not his territory. 
53. The history of government bills in India goes back to 
early tenth century A.D., when we find the king of_Kashmir, 
paying his foot soldiers in hundika.' .(Rajatarangni op.cit.) 
A modern writer has traced its antiquity to the 'adesa' of 
the Mauryan period. R.N. Saletore, Encyclopaedia of 
Indian Culture, II, p. 550. The Lekhapaddhati evidence 
also relates to the imperial bills of exchange (rajahun-
dika), Pushpa Prasad, 'Credit and Mortgage Documents in 
Lekhapaddhati', op.cit. 
54. Factories (NS), 1678-84, pp. 74-75, 115. 
55. Malcolm, II, pp. 88-90. 
46 
merchants also paid for Bengal merchandise fn hills discounted 
56 
by the Central Indian bankers. Another Interesting fact noted 
was the recurring negotiability of these bills, which led to the 
creation of a kind of 'floating credit'. 
The English East India Company officials serving in 
Central India also engaged the services of the garrafs to remit 
58 
money to their familities. 
The English factors showed occasional care In selecting 
garrafs for such transactions as the credit worthiness of garrafs 
59 
and their 'firms' was generally recognized. As early as 1616, 
the Surat factors were remitting money to Ahmedabad even without 
knowing about the acceptance of their bills, simply "on the 
60 
faith of Shroffs' declarations". In 1621, the Patna garrafs 
agreed to redeem an English factors' bill, though it was not 
drawn by their correspondent, anticipating its subsequent 
redemp 
56. 
57. 
58. 
61 
tion. 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
Ibid 
59. Supplementary Calender, op.cit., p. 78, Temple, p.358. 
60. Supplementary Calender, op.cit. , p. 64. 
n. contd.../-
47 
The ledger of the Armenian merchant, Hovhannes, offers 
62 
several examples of credit transactions affected without a bill. 
Though the parties to the bills in these cases were the Armenian 
merchants themselves, it is, however, true that mutual under-
standing and credit worthiness enabled the indigenous bankers to 
create an Incessant stream of 'book credit' in days when the 
volume of commerce was large enough to strike the attentic^^ of a 
63 
foreign observer. 
3. Rate of Exchange : 
The rate of exchange was the actual price paid for a 
hundi, being the ratio between the amount stated in the hundi 
64 
and the initial payment made against it. Most of the "exchange" 
n. contd... 
61. Factories, 1618-21, pp. 247-8. See also C.N.Cooke, Rise, 
Progress and Present Condition of Banking in India (Cal-
cutta, 1863), p. 83: 'although millions were invested, the 
loss by bad debts, arising out of dishonour of the instru-
ments at maturity, was a most insignificant fraction 
percent. 'Cited by Rajat Kanta Ray, 'The bazaar : Changing 
Structural characteristics of the indigenous Section of 
the Indian Economy before and after the Great Depression'. 
lESHR, Vol. XXV, No.3, July-September 1988, p.305. 
62. Khachikian, p. 262. 
63. Malcolm, II p. 90. 
64. Called 'hundian' in Hindi, and 'hundawan' in Marathi and 
Rajasthanl. Twilson, Glossary of Judicial and Revenue 
Terms, op.cit., p. 212 S.W.), 'hundilii"' 'hundawan' (B.L. 
Bhadanl, 'Money lending and Exchange in Seventeenth century 
and eighteenth century, Marwar', PIHC, 1977, p. 277). 
Mirat-i Ahmadi, p. 411, uses the 'antMIl for the deduction 
suffered upon redeeming a bill with cash. We are intro-
duced to the term 'Oant' once again in Malcolm, II, p.90n, 
who equates it with 'accomodation bill', a form of book 
credit. Wilson, op.cit., s.v. 'ant' , seems to have had 
this in mind when he terms it a fictitious currency of 
Gujarat. He cites the term ankara for deduction while 
encashing an ant bill. 
48 
quotations come from the commercial correspondence of the 
European factors in India. In these documents a single rate of 
exchange is quoted for both type of bills, those drawn by 
merchants (mainly to raise credit) and those by the garrafs 
(mainly to facilitate remittance . Only on rare occasions are 
separate rates quoted. Sometimes the rates are given in ratio 
between coins of different denominations in use in the two places 
involved (such as mahimudi : rupee rates in respect of bills 
67 
drawn at Surat on the 'rupee' areas of the Mughal Empire). 
In such cases it is not possible for us to determine the real 
rate of exchange on bills unless we have simultaneous evidence 
about the relative values of the two categories of coins at that 
time. On such evidence as exists Irfan Hablb discusses the 
factors which to a large extent, determined the rate of exchange. 
They were the 'balance of payments' between the places concerned; 
the duration of the hundl; and the interest currently charged on 
/TO 
loans and deposits. Depending on these conditions, as well as 
on competition between the sarrifs, a hundl either carried a 
69 
premium or a discount. 
65. The term 'exchange' In these documents occur both for 
premium and discount on the hundis, Factories, 1622-23, 
p.40; 1624-29, p. 273, 1618-21, p. 236. 
66. Factories, 1622-23, pp. 68-69; Hablb, 'Bills of Exchange' 
p. 292. 
67. Supplementary Calendar, op.clt., p. 55; Factories, 1618-21 
pp. 104, 105; Hablb, 'Banking in Mughal India', p.9 and n.39. 
68. Hablb, 'Bills of Exchange*, p. 295. 
69. Akbar Nama, III p. 762. 
49 
The duration of hundl was specified in the document 
70. _ _ 71 
itself. In case a hundi was payable at sight (darshaii.i--hundi) 
72 73-
a customary grace of four or five days was allowed. The muddati 
-74 
(miadi) hundi was paid after a stipulated time reckoned from the 
day It was produced before the drawee. The interest charged on 
the principal amount carried by the hundi was normally calcula-
76 
ted on the basis of the duration of the hundi (band i muddat) and 
the time taken to produce it. It was precisely because of this 
reason that, while making remittance, the English sometimes 
desired a speedy messenger to carry the bill to the destined 
place in minimum time. In 1647, the Ahraedabad factors suspected, 
following the tardy delivery of the bills, that the sarrafs 
70. Factories, 1618-21, p. 247. 
71. L.C. Jain, Indigenous Banking in India, op.cit., p. 72; 
Wilson, Glossary of Judicial and Revenue Terms, op.cit., 
s.V. darsani hundi: 
72. Supplementary Calendar, op.cit., p. 78. 
73. Factories 1618-21, pp. 97-8; Jain, op.cit., p. 72. 
74. Jain, op.cit., Wilson, op.cit., p. 218 s.v. ' hundi miadi. 
75. Habib, op.cit., p. 295. 
76. Factories, 1613-21, pp. 97-8. 
77. Temple op.cit. , pp. 368-9. 
50 
78 , . u 
might have bribed the messengers. This obviously explains the 
sarrafs design of keeping money for a period longer than was 
assumed while fixing the rate. Thirsting for liquidity, a 
merchant might be compelled to ask for payment before maturity. 
79 
Until the nuances of the term 'deheig' are properly ascertained, 
one would therefore agree to the suggestion that it was some 
80 
kind of discount charged on encashing bills before maturity. 
The discount and premium rates of the hundis included the 
rate of interest charged on short term commercial loans. The 
interest on the merchants and the sarrafs' hundis was charged at 
two different rates. The sarrafs charged more on their loans 
than what they themselves considered while accepting deposits. 
It was this difference which in fact constituted the sarrafd 
service charges or brokerage. 
78. Factories, 16A6-50, p. 102. 
79. Factories, 1618-21, pp. 97-8. 
JO. Habib, op.cit., p. 295. 
81. Habib, 'Usury in Medieval India', pp. 402-3; 'Bills of 
Exchange' p. 292. 
:: 51 : : 
For the sarra"fs, the business of discounting bills was 
more profitable than simple money-lending, perhaps because it 
gave them the benefit of service charges, and because they could 
transfer the hundis, whereas they could not presumably similarly 
transfer d'ibus.. Secondly, it also helped them improve their 
'balance-of-payments' position. This was evident oarHcularly 
during the time of paucity of money. In Patna, in .''.721, the 
scarcity of money raised the discount oa merchants' bills to such 
an extent that the English preferred borrowing money than drawing 
bills. Soon after ward. the sarrafs stopped lending at simple 
rate of interest and totally restricted their business to dls-
82 
counting bills. 
The §arrafs had to strike a balance between the margin of 
profit and the demand for money. They were aware of the risks 
Involved in any wide discrepancy between these two, which could 
make transactions in bills a purely merchant's affair. Given the 
briskness of commerce in Mughal India, merchants could conceiva-
bly have sought each other out for mutual beneflt^ ."^  
82. Annals, Vol. Ill, pp. 3A0, 376, 385. 
83. Habib, op.cit., p. 292. 
:: 52 :: 
This apprehension was valid as several examples of 
merchants dispensing with the services of the garrats exist. 
Of these, two may serve as illustrations. In 1622, when the 
discount on remittance from Burhanpur to Ahmedabad was 6^ -% to 
84 
6|%, the English were getting money at par at Ahmadabad by 
S5 
discounting bills of a Burhapuri merchant. On another occasion, 
they raised money at Isfahan by issuing bills to those merchants 
who wanted to remit funds to Surat. The exchange for this was 
merely money for money . 
Thus, in order to conduct their business, the §arrafs had 
to strike a balance between the credit they received and the 
credit they gave at any one place, while issuing and discounting 
bills. Also, since their network was spread throughout the 
empire, they had to keep a constant cash flow in order to main-
tain an over-all balance. All this the sarrafs achieved through 
the movement of the 'exchange' rates, mod lying them when 
84. Factories, 1622-23, pp. 24, 40. 
85. Ibid., p. 59. 
86. Factories, 1646-50, p. 180. 
87. The Ahmadabad sarrafs were not discounting bills in order 
to keep money in hand to meet bills expected from Surat, 
Factories, 1646-50, pp. 63-64. 
53 
specific trade condition prevailed or particular events disturbed 
88 
the payment flow that had prevailed till hitherto. 
There existed, therefore, a correlation between the rates 
of the sarraYs and the merchant's hundis drawn at any one place 
on the other. Whatever be the cash position of the place, the 
two rates remained directly proportional to each other, i.e., 
any rise or fall in the rates of the garra'f's hundis was attended 
by a corresponding rise or fall in the rates of the merchant!s 
hundis. In 1623, the rebel Prince Khurram commanded the 
Ahmadabad garrafs to transfer treasure to Mandu, causing a great 
scarcity of money at the former place. As a result, the exchange 
rate of garrafs hundi drawn at Ahmadabad fell from 42? Rupees 
per 100 mahmudls payable at Surat in 1622, to under 41 Rupees 
89 
per 100 mahmudls payable at Surat in 1623. Similarly, the 
exchange rate on merchant's hundi also fell from 42i Rupees per 
100 mahmudl's payable at Surat in 1622 to 41i Rupees per 100 
- - 90 
mahmudls payable at Surat in 1623. 
88. See, for example, the impact of the movement of goods on 
the rates of hundis drawn at Patna and Agra in Habib, 
op.clt., p. 294. 
89. Factories, 1618-21, pp. 68, 88, 181. 
90. Ibid., pp. 69, 199. 
: : 54 : : 
These rates did not simply depend on the cash position 
of the place where bills were drawn, but also on the place of the 
final cash reckoning. Burhanpur, when it contained the Mughal 
damp, normally enjoyed a favourable cash position in that the 
91 
foreign merchants, who simply sold their goods at that place, had 
plenty of money to remit. At Ahmadabad, on the contrary, money 
was always required by the foreign merchants for indigo invest-
ments. As a result in 1622, remittances from Ahmadabad to 
, 92 
Burhanpur carried a premium of 7% to 71%, while reverse reml-
93 
ttances bore a discount of 6i to 6x%. Similarly, the merchants' 
hundis drawn on Burhanpur at Ahmadabad during the same period 
9A . 
were 'exchanged' for 91^ Rupees 'sicca' per 100 Burhanpurl Rupees. 
It, thus, appears that the garra"fs encouraged the flow of cash 
from Burhanpur to Ahmadabad and discouraged reverse remittance, 
in order to maintain a money balance. 
The availability of money at a place sometimes exercised 
determining influence over the duration of the hundis. Surat, 
I 95 
being Indias major pont, had large imports of bullion. This 
91. Pelsaert, op.cit., p. 38. 
92. Factories, 1622-23, pp. 48, 68-69. 
93. Ibid., pp. 24, 40. 
94. Ibid. , pp. 68-69. 
95. Tavernier, I, pp. 31-32. 
55 
meant that there was more pressure at Surat for bullion remitt-
ances inland than at other trade centres. Thus, the rate of 
remittance from Ahmadabad to Agra was far cheaper than from 
Surat to Ahmadabad. This was despite the fact that the hundt was 
drawn at Surat on Agra for forty-one days, while that on 
Ahmadabad it was for four days. Primarily for this • reason, the 
English sometimes transported their bullion from Surat to 
Ahmadabad, rather than do it through bills, though the minting 
97 
charges at Ahmadabad were higher than at Surat. 
A relationship has been suggested between the exchange 
rates of remittances and reverse remittances at any two given 
98 places. Since this relationship was identical to the one that 
prevailed between the sarraFs and merchant's hundis at any one 
place on the other rates either way would also have a tendency 
to correspond to each other in a direct ratio. 
96. Supplementary Calendar, op.rlt., p.55; Khachikian, p.174. 
97. Factories 1634-36, pp. 217-18; 1630-33, p. 196. 
98. Habib, 'Banking, in Mughal India', pp. 112-113; 'Bills 
of Exchange' pp. 292-93. 
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The rates of the merchant's hundl also varied with the 
reputation of the drawer. In 1665, three rates were quoted for a 
99 
hundi drawn at Agra on Surat, with the Dutch paying the lowest. 
In modern literature we find mention of hundis payable to ordi-
nary and respectable persons. There is an instance of an inland 
bill being insured by the discounter, obviously because he was in 
doubt about the drawers' reputation. 
Any discussion of the type of coins used In bill payments 
In the Mughal Empire has to grapple with a key problem. In 
reconstructing the quotations of exchange rates from available 
sources, one finds that rupee coins of several denominations were 
used for payments. It is therefore essential to mention the 
peculiarities of the Mughal rupee coin. 
The value of the Mughal rupee varied in terms of its age. 
The newly minted coin (sikka) enjoyed its full value and premium 
over those coined In the preceding years of the- same reign 
99. Factories, 1655-60, pp. 18-19. 
100. For dhanjog and sahjog hundis See Jain, op.clt., p. 78. 
101. Factories, 1634-36, p. 103. 
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(chalanl). The coins minted in the previous reigns were called 
102 
khazana and were accepted at a still larger discount. 
It appears that the bills of exchange were paid in all the 
103 
three types of rupee coin, depending on the terms of 'exchange', 
profit expected by the parties and the coins current at the place 
of receipt. 
At Agra, payment for bills was always made in rupees 
104 
called 'hondis' or 'hundis'. These were certainly the standard 
coins paid on hundis drawn and honoured at Agra and hence had 
acquired this particular name. The 'hondis' appear to have been 
105 
the current (chalani) rupees. These were accepted at a discount 
lOfk 
of one to above two percent in relation to s ikka. In 1631, when 
the Agra sarrafs intended to deduct a further three percent from 
chalanl rupees while making payments to the English, the later 
protested, claiming that these hundl 'rupees' had always been 
102. Habib, 'Currency System of the Mughal Empire', op.cit., 
pp. 3-4. One does not really know whether khazana was 
used only for the coins minted under Akbar's reign. 
103. Supplementary Calendar, op.cit., 71,73,112; Factories, 
1630-33, p. 154. 
104. Supplementary Calender, ibid., p. 89, Factories, 1618-21, 
pp. 85, 146, 236. 
105. Factories, 1618-21, p. 248. 
106. Habib, op.cit., pp. 3-4. 
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current in payments of bills of exchange. 'Honds' had also 
become the medium of payments In other forms of transactions 
108 
concluded at Agra. 
While the coins current at Burhanpur were the Burhanpuri 
khazani rupees, at Ahmadabad, the newly minted coins (sikka^ were 
normally used in bill transactions. In 1616, the Surat factors 
Instructed Burhanpur factory to send all the available cash to 
Jll 
Ahmadabad "paying in Cassanaes, to be received in Seccawes . 
Payments on bills of exchange drawn at Bengal were also made in 
112 
sikka rupees. 
For the hundis issued at Patna, the amount was paid in 
'nuryes', which were probably the newly minted rupees of Jahangir's 
J IW reign .'•^^ 
107. Factories 1630-33. p. 154. 
108. Letters Received, op.cit., Vol. IV, pp. 237-38. 
109. Supplementary Calendar, op.cit. , p. 65. 
110. Factories, 1622-25, pp. 68-69. 
111. Supplementary Calendar, op.cit., p. 71. 
112. Annals, Vol. 1, p. 307; vol. II, part I, p. 243. 
113. Factories,1618-21, p. 236. 
114. Habit, 'Currency System of the Mughal Empire', op.cit., 
p. 2 and .n. 
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115 
While the merchants preferred payment In new silver coins, 
the sarrafs looking for gain tried to enforce payment in 
worn out coins. 
The fact that the English merchants continued using the 
indigenous network of bills of exchange to facilitate their own 
commerce in India suggests that the rates were acceptable to 
them. Even in their commercial correspondence they never 
117 
considered these exorbitant. One would like to reinforce the 
suggestion that the 'administrative unity and law and order' 
established by the Mughals was responsible to a great extent in 
118 
keeping the 'exchange' rates to a moderate level. The high rates 
lie 
of 8, 9 and 10% quoted for Golconda f rom 1644-46 on remittances 
from Surat set them apart for the average rates prevalent in the 
Mughal territories were much lower. 
The dearth of a class of people dealing in commercial 
12i 
papers at Golconda, as also the high rates, forced the English 
115. Tavernier, I, pp. 26-8. 
116. Factories, 1630-33, p. 154. 
117. Habib, 'Banking in Mughal India', op.cit., p. 10. 
118. [bid. 
119. Factories, 1642-45, p. 207. 16-46-50, p. 17. 
120. Factories, 1637-41, p. 262. 
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factors, who usually remitted money from Surat to their centres 
of investment, to take to alternative means of either borrowing 
121 
money at Golconda or shipping if off to Masulipattam. Once they 
used the good offices of a Mughal noble to shift the burden of 
122 
debt of Golconda factors to Surat, presumably through getting 
their bills accommodated. 
Similarly, the Inherent risks of deteriorating political 
condition, together with a considerable increase in the amount 
123 
of bill money and paucity of actual coins, contributed to a rise 
in 'exchange' rates in the first half of the 18th century. In 
1720, a bill of remittance from Surat to Agra suffered a discount 
124 
of 10 to 15%. The Dutch Director noted that commercial insta-
bility, followed by the political crisis after Aurangzeb's death 
- 1-25 jeopardized the business of the sarrafs. 
121. Factories, 1642-45, p.207. 
122. ibid 
123. Mirat-t Ahmadi, op.cit., p. 410. The sarrafs raised the 
'anth' discount to eight (or even twenty)percent at Ahma-
dabad in 1715, as a result of 'scarcity of money'. 
124. Ashin Das Gupta, 'Trade and Politics in eighteenth century, 
in D.S. Richards ed. Islan and the Trade of Asia, Oxford, 
1970, p. 189. 
125. -:;bid. , p. 188. 
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It therefore appears that In the Seventeenth century 
through the ubiquitous use of bills of exchange the §arrafs were 
not only able to finance a great deal of long distance inland 
commerce and overseas trade of the Mughal Empire but were also 
successful In Integrating, at least financially, the widespread 
commercial networks all over India, byoffering credit facilities. 
CHAPTER - IV 
INSURANCE, RESPONDENTIA. AND BOTTOMRY 
Indian commerce during the Mughal times was supported by a 
system of Insurance which was closely linked to it. 
While discussing the sarrafs' business in bills of 
exchange, the author of Khulasat ut Twirlkh, Sujan Rai Bhandari, 
mentions yet another practice which they used to undertake. Any 
one could deposit his "goods and merchandise and other property 
and baggage" with the sarra^fs; the latter, after taking their 
fee, conveyed them to the destined place safely (basalamat). This 
practice, he says, was designated bima. 
A reference to the same practice, called 'bemah', defined 
as 'ensurance', occurs in the commercial correspondence of the 
English factors at Surat. In 1662, unable to obtain specific 
varieties of cloth from Agra due to lack of adequate resources, 
the English approached the sarrafs who agreed to invest Rs. one 
lakh at Agra and transport the goods to Surat for timely despatch 
to Europe. The deal, however, could not materialize as the 
English, for total want of money in their hands, could not pay an 
initial amount of Rs. 20,000 to the sarrafs? 
!• Khulasat ut Twarikh, p. 25. The relevent passage is tran-
slated in Habib, 'Banking in Mughal India', p. 15. 
2. Factories, 1661-64. p. 86 
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These descriptions point to a system where insurance 
proper was joined to carriage. Rere the sarrafs undertook actual 
conveyance of the merchants' consignment (and not simply bearing 
3 
risks of loss of consignment in conveyance). The charges were 
A 
indeed often shown together with the cost of carriage, suggesting 
that the insurers were also often the transporters. In such 
cases the Insurers must have had to pay the cost of carriage 
and custom duties. The rates for such arrangements, therefore, 
must certainly have been high as appears from a single instance 
of payment of Re. 0.50 for insurance and carriage by the English 
on each maund of lead priced at 5 Rs., transported from Cambay 
to Ahmadabad. 
There already existed a class of people in India who 
specialized in undertaking payment of custom dues as also cartage 
In return of a consolidated sum. The English frequently employed 
men called 'adowayes', who relieved them of the two crucial 
3. Kh^ulasat ut Twa'rlkh, p. 25. 
A. Factories, 1668-69, p. 190. 
5. Ibid. , For goods despatched from Agra to Surat, Tavemier 
quotes rates from 15 to 20 percent. We do not really know 
whether they Include Insurance charges. Tavernier, II 
p.21. 
6. Mundy, op.clt., II, pp. 278, 291. 
7. Ibid.', Supplementary Calendar, p.56. 
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problems of the availability of carriage, and payment of sundry 
custom dues particularly when the goods traversed the territories 
8. 
of independent chiefs. The 'adowayes' were simple contractors 
who took a lump sum from the merchants and made their profit out 
of savings from tax-payments. They co-existed with the insurers 
in a way that is not very clear to us. 
Malcolm, writing in 1824 about Malwa, describes a class 
of people called 'Hoondah Bharawallattn or 'Hoondit', who seem 
9' 
to be the exact counterpart of the seventeenth century 'adowayes'. 
At the same time, vAile talking about insurance proper, he says 
that the insurers not only insured the goods but also 'take upon 
10 
themselves the carriage and contract to pay all duties. Thus, 
early in the nineteenth century too, there were two separate 
professional groups undertaking carriage for merchants, one 
of which in addition also insured the baggage. 
It would seen that given the medieval conditions of 
11' 
inland trade, with considerable insecurity on the routes. 
8. Tavernier, I, pp. 30-32; Moreland, From Akbar to Aurangzeb, 
op.cit., pp. 150-1. 
9. Malcolm, II, p.95 and n. 
10. Ibid.,pp. 93, 95 and n. 
11. For eleborate arrangements against robbery see Mandelslo, 
op.cit. , p. 13. 
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insurance essentially served against robbery. We come across a 
description of a class of people called charans, proficient In 
escorting the merchants safely through the areas frequented by 
the robbers by offering the latter a certain sum of money. As 
Thevenot says that the 'Banians' made use of these people, it 
is not far too wrong to conclude that the garra"fs also employed 
them to facilitate their own business. We are sold that in the 
early nineteenth century, the insurance firms of central India, 
"were compelled to bribe the most powerful plunderers of the 
, ..13 day . 
Besides this specifically Indian form, there existed the 
usual forms of insurance also, devoid of any obligations on the 
part of the sarrafs to convey goods. This Included insurance 
of goods in transit over land and seas. There is, however, no 
evidence of life insurance, known to have existed in England 
as early as 1583, or even general insurance of Immovable 
12. Thevenot, op.cit., p. 19. Thevenot who tells stories about 
charans, however, declines to avail of their services 
considering them 'too low a kined of protection'. 
13. Malcolm, II, p. 93; See Pelsaert, op.cit., p.58 for heavy 
tolls paid by the merchants to the 'rebels' in the seven-
teenth century. 
l^. Encyclopaedia Britannlca, 1966, vol. 12, p. 338. 
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property. Among the goods and cargoes generally insured, that of 
bullion was quite- common. We have seen that the English 
supplied capital to their inland factories by remitting money 
through bills of exchange. This method sometimes did not work, 
particularly in the areas outside the realm of Mughal admini-
15 
stra-ion, and money was directly despatched after it was insured. 
In 1640, the English factors at Musulipatam considered the 
insured delivery of money from Golconda as the cheapest way of 
procuring money, for no one in Masulipatam dealt with exchange, 
and the exchange was in any case very dear. In the absence of 
an insurer, the company once did not dare risk sending bullion 
17 
from Swally to the Surat mint. In such cases, there is no 
suggestion of the garra"fs being obliged to convey the goods 
Insured, and from the moderate rates quoted for such transaction 
(See Appendix to the chapter), it is clear that the charges could 
not possibly have covered the payment of custom dues and cartage. 
Information furnished by the English merchants suggest 
arrangements of marine insurance mainly at the port cities of 
Surat and Cambay. The references so far traced are only to the 
insurance of English or Dutch ships or the cargoes of English 
15. Factories (NS), 1680-84, p. 306. 
16. Factories, 1637-41, p. 262. 
17. Factories (NS), 1670-71 p. 200 
:: 67 :: 
18 
merchants abroad English or Indian vessels. Since the Indigenous 
records are silent over this aspect it is difficult to estimate 
the participation of Indian merchants and shipowners. It has 
been suggested that the Indian merchants while sending their 
19 
goods abroad would either do so on respondentia or insure them. 
The reluctance of investments in shipping among Indian merchants 
is partly attributed to the absence of large insurance firms in 
Mughal India. 2*^  
The sarrafs along side their business of inland insurance 
undertook marine insurance as wellt They normally worked as 
individuals but sometimes also on a partnership basis. It was 
only in the beginning of the nineteenth century that a joint 
stock company, the Bombay Insurance Society, was established in 
BombayT But even in the seventeenth century, in case of a big 
deal there is evidence of the garrafs acting in correspondence. 
18. Factories, 1651-5A, p. 177; 1642-A5 p. 61. 
19. Ashin Das Gupta, Indian Merchants and the decline of Surat 
c. 1700-1750, Weisbaden, 1979, p. 85. 
20. Ibid., Also Ashin Das Gupta, Indian Merchants and the 
Indian Ocean., CEHI, 1, pp. 417-18. 
21. Factories, 1655-60, pp.62, 71, 74; Habib, 'Banking in 
Mughal India', p. 15 and n; 'Merchant Communities,, pp. 
35-36. 
22. V.D. Divekar, CEHI, II, p. 342; also see Malcolm, II, pp. 
93-7. 
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In 165A, the English were dealing with more than one insurer over 
23 
a disputed claim. 
In the absence of actual documents containing the terms 
of insurance, it is difficult to ascertain the nature of even-
tualities under which claims were made and premiums fixed. It, 
however, appears that wreckage and other risks, besides piracy, 
could be covered. In 1643, which was a period of piratical 
24 
activities by the Malabaris and the French, the rate of insurance 
of an English ship went up from 3 percent to 30 percent at Surat, 
as the delay in its arrival made the merchants and speculators 
25 
a 
nxlous about its safety. This exorbitant rise in the premium 
was perhaps due to the treasure, amounting to 'ten lack rials, 
26 
that the ship carried. The post-facto ascent In Insurance rate 
suggests either reinsurance or the fact that the English 
approached the insurers subsequently. 
The reason ascribed by the English for a ten percent 
premium charged on a Dutch ship at Bandar Abbas was the long 
23. Factories, 1651-54, pp. 2 24. 
24. Surendra Gopal, Commerce and Crafts in Gujarat, 16th and 
17th cfcnturies (New D«>Til, I975>, p. 112. 
25. Factories, 1642-45, p. 92. 
26. Ibid. 
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27 
voyage, it had undertaken. This suggests that the speculators 
believed in the risks at sea increasing with the length of 
sailing. Fire insurance originated in its modern form following 
2S 
the Great Fire of London in 1666. It is difficult to agree with 
the view that security was given in India against fire hazards 
29 
during the same period. Even if one accepts that besides con-
tracting bottomry loans, Banaji Revadas, sure of the fate of his 
ships, also arranged for their Insurance, it is not clear whether 
he made a claim against fire hazard after burning his ships or 
30 
simply based his claims on the basis of wreckage on high sea. 
War risks also seem to have been covered while insuring 
ships. In 1654, the English at Surat affected the insurance of 
their ship for 7500 rupees, suspecting evil intentions of the 
Dutch. After its seizure by the Dutch, they advanced their claim 
but the insurers refused to pay. The governor of Surat, Hafiz 
Nasr, upheld the decision of the insurers. When the English 
made an appeal to the court, the Governor appointed a committee 
27. Factories, 1651-54, p. 177; 
28. Encyclopaedia Britannica, op.cit., p. 338. 
29. A.J. Qaisar, 'Merchant Shipping in India during the seven-
teenth century'. Medieval India - A Miscellany, vol. II, 
Aligarh, p. 210 for an Instance of fire insurance. 
30. Factories, 1665-67, p. 202. 
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of four 'Baniyans' to look into the matter. The committee 
decided that the English be paid by the insurers who, in turn, 
should be compensated by the Dutch. The dispute lingered on for 
two years, and the English used all possible means to obtain 
satisfaction from the insurers. The two European Companies were 
also not without supporters. While the Governor of Sjrat, remain-
ing lukewarm, covertly favoured the Dutch, the English used the 
good offices of princess Jahanara. What is significant is that 
the claim of the English was regarded as unjust by the sarrafs 
and their advocates not because they demanded compensation 
against war risks, but because of the fact that the English ship 
sailed at times of peace between the two companies and was 
31 
voluntarily surrendered to the Dutch. 
From the available premium quotations, the inland insur-
ance rates seem to have ranged from 0.50 percent to 2.5 percent 
of the value of the goods insured, depending presumably on 
distance and security risks involved. 
The Insurance charges seem quite moderate for the period, 
32' 
though they were not moderate by the English merchants. However, 
the fact that they could not dispense with it appears from their 
31. Factories, 1651-54, p. 224; 1655-60, pp. 10, 15, 62,71,74. 
32. Factories, 1661-64, p. 86; Factories (NS)^ 1670-77, pp. 
284-5. 
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sense of frustration when the Company prohibited the use of 
33 
Insurance In 1678. The English demanded discretion in this 
matter, and in 1680, the goods from Agra to Surat were insured 
against loss In transit under 'extra-ordinary' cases". In 1682, 
the Company insured all its goods in transit from inland 
35 
factories to Surat, anticipating disturbances around Surat. 
Insurance seems to have been practised at major trading 
centres of Mughal India. It prevalence in the Punjab is attested 
36 
by the account of Sujan Ral Bhandari. It was spread through 
37 
out the western coastal regions and its heartland. Insurance 
38 
firms operated throughout the central India as late as 1824. 
39 
In the Deccan, a single instance of insurance is reported. The 
high charges quoted indicate that the business in insurance was 
not brisk. On the Coromandel coast, however, where sundry 
33. Factories (NS), 1680-84, p. 236. 
34. Ibid., p. 257. 
35. Ibid., pp. 293-94. 
36. Khulasat ut Twarikh, p. 25. 
37. Factories (NS), 1670-77, pp. 284-5; also see Appendix I to 
this chapter. 
38. Malcolm, pp. 90-3. 
39. Factories, 1637-41, p. 262. 
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mercantile and credit practices existed, one does not find any 
40 
mention of Insurance. 
Bengal, which was a major exporter of raw silk, in whose 
trade the European Companies' participation increased in the 
course of the seventeenth century, had a fairly developed credit 
system. One is, therefore, surprised to find the absence of 
insurance and respondentia arrangements in this region. The two 
major works on the trade and economy of Bengal in the seventeenth 
and early eighteenth century also do not refer to this practice 
at all.^ 'l 
There were certain other forms of credit prevalent in 
Mughal India, marked by elements of risk and speculation. These 
seem best represented by respondentia and bottomry loans. Not 
much has been said about these forms, essentially in view of the 
42 
scarcity of information on the subject. 
40. Sinnapah Arasaratnam, Merchants, Companies and Commerce on 
the Coromandel Coast, 1650-1740, Delhi, 1986 does not 
mention insurance at all. 
41. Susil Chaudhury. Trade and Commercial Organization in 
Bengal, 1650-1720, Calcutta, 1975; Om Prakash, The Dutch 
East India Company anj^  the Economy of Bengal, 1630-1720 
Princeton, 1985. 
42. Habib, 'Usury in Medieval India', p. 405, was the first to 
talk about it, followed by Qaisar, 'Merchant Shipping in 
India during seventeenth century', op.cit., pp.12-14. 
Tavernler (1640-66), while discussing the commercial 
status of Surat, makes the following interesting observations : 
"On arrival for embarkation at Surat, you find there 
plenty of moeny. For it is the principal trade of the nobles of 
India to place their money on vessels in speculations ^  for 
Hormuz, Bassora and Mocha, and even for Bantam, Achin and 
Philllpines. For Mocha and Bassora the exchange ranges from 22 
to 24 percent; and for Hormuz from 16 to 20; and for the other 
places which I have named the exchange varies in proportion to 
the distance. But if the goods happened to be lost by tempest, 
or to fall into the hands of the Malabaris, who are the pirates 
of the Indian seas, the money Is lost to those who have risked 
lending it " .^^ 
The practice discussed by Tavernler had certain features 
which distinguished It from ordinary forms of credit. The loan 
was advanced against the goods of the borrower, the creditor 
accepting the risks if the goods were lost. The high risks 
attached to the voyage and the long duration of the loan explain 
the high rates charged on it. The rates were attractive enough 
for the Mughal nobility to Invest part of their wealth in such 
voyages. 
In the commercial correspondence of the English factors 
in India, we come across a similar practice designated as 'avugge' 
or 'awg'. Under this, money was lent to a person against his 
goods who repaid the amount with high interest rates, either 
to the lender"s nominee or to the lender himself on condition of 
43. Tavernler, 1, p. 31, 
44. Tavernler, 1, p.31. M. Athar All, op.cit. , pp. 154-55; 
Satish Chandra, op.cit., pp.321-32 
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45 
safe arrival of the ship at the destined place. 
This practice was essentially the Indian version of the 
European respondentia in which money was lent upon the cargo of 
a vessel to be repaid, with interest, only after the goods 
46. 
arrived safely at their destination. 
A reference,probably to the same practice, exists in the 
ledger of an Armenian merchant : "On the 21st of the month of 
Shams (Azaria Stylell I borrowed an avak of 1,000 rupees from 
Markos, son of Top Ghent Poghos, in "SaiMar - Surat provided I 
should pay in Isfahan with an interest of 26%. The avak borrowed 
was 260 rupees. The loan with its interest came to 1260 rupees. 
I signed a liability at the rate of 27 rupees per tuman pledging 
that 105 days after I arrived on board the Slemanl in Bandar 
Abbas he got entitled to the sum of 46 tumans 6,660 dians, to be 
reimbursed by my master in Isfahan"47' 
Though there is no reference to the condition under which 
the debt was to be satisfied, the high interest rate quoted 
indicates that it was a respondentia arrangement. This seems 
45. Factories, 1637-41, p. 272; 1651-54, pp. 211-12; Ovington, 
op.cit., p. 174. 
46. Oxford English Dictionary, vol. VIII, Oxford 1933, p.54, 
i.V. 'Respondentia*. 
47. Khachlkian, p. 175. The Armenian merchant, Hovhannes, was 
trading under commenda; hence, in this case, his debt was 
satisfied by his principal. 
reasonable in view of the fact that Hol^hannes was buying goods 
from Surat and carrying them to Persia. As for inland loans, 
Tavemier describes it in some detail : 
"But when it happens that the merchant finds himself short 
of money in these places, and has need of some to enable him to 
pay for the goods which he has bout;ht, he must meet it at Surat, 
when the bill is due, which is at two months, and by paying a 
high rate of exchange. ... 
At Lahore on Surat the exchange goes up to 6i percent ; at 
Agra from 4i to 5; at Ahmadabad from 1 to li; at Sironj to 3; at 
Burhanpur from 2\ to 3; at Dacca to 10; at Patna from 7 to 8; at 
Benares to 6. ; at Golconda from 4 to 5 and on Goa the same; 
at Deccan to 3; at Bijapur to 3; at Daulatabad from 1 to l\". 
He further adds : "Besides, it is not to be wondered at 
that the exchange is so high, for those who lend the money must. • 
accept on their part the risk that if the goods are stolen the 
money is lost to them".^8 
This apparently seems to be a combination of credit with 
A9. 
Insurance, since the premium was built into the discount rates. 
But in one essential aspect, this type of transaction, which 
combined in itself the elements of usury and risk sharing,was 
different from both ordinary money lending and insurance. Though 
we have not come across any detailed evidence, it appears that 
in insurance proper the claimants were paid to the total value 
50 
of the goods insured. In case of insured bills of exchange. 
48. Tavernier, 1, pp.30-32. 
49. Habib, 'Banking in Mughal India', p. 13; 'Merchant Commu-
nities ', pp. 35-36. 
50. Factories, 1642-45, p. 216. 
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the premium was charged keeping In view the amount of principal; 
and the sarrafs only lost a sum to the borrower which would, 
51 
of course, be less than the money value of the goods. This can 
be contrasted with the jokhaml h u n d f of the modern indigenous 
banking which involved coverage of the 'risk of the loss of 
value in the transport of goods'»52 
There was yet another practice of a nature called bottomry 
in Europe, in which instead of the goods, the ship was pledged 
as security for repayment. In case the ship was lost the lender 
lost, his money; its safe arrival entitled him to receive the 
5*3 
principal with the stipulated interest. 
51. Tavernier 1, p. 216. 
52. Jain, op.clt., p. 78; In such transactions the bill was 
drawn by a merchant who consigned his goods to a parti-
cular place. The drawee, in this case-N the buyer, honoured 
the bill to make payment for the goods dispatched to him. 
In case of loss of consignment, the Interest of the drawee 
was protected, the risk being borne either by the drawer 
or by a third person who, by buying the bill, acted as an 
insurance agent. We do not find any reference to such an 
arrangement in our period. For a similar practice in 
Europe see Braudel, op.clt., pp. 142-5; Jacob M. Price, 
op.clt., p. 13. There is, however, an instance of insur-
ance of an amount carried by a bill of exchange. Factories, 
1646-50, p. 103. 
53. Oxford English Dictionary, op.clt., vol 1, p. 1017, s.v. 
'Bottomry'. 
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In Mughal India, respondentia arrangements were not 
Infrequent, but there are only two possible bottomry transactions 
In our sources. This is when the fraudulent practice of a Malabar 
merchant, Banjee Revadas, are referred to; it being his wont to 
buy old vessels, take up 'awg' on them and then set fire to them 
54 
to make his gains from the 'insurers'. If this is not a case 
of marine insurance, it could only be one of bottomry. 
It was reported by the English factors in 1669 that Khwaja 
Mlnas, an Armenian merchant, had taken up bottomry loans, along 
55 
with other merchants of Surat, to export calicoes to Phillipines. 
56 
Khwaja Minas, being a substantial ship owner, it was not unusual 
for him to have pledged the bottom of his ships. But the other 
merchants who invested in the same voyage could only have made 
respondentia arrangements. The difference in rates quoted in 
this case might be due to the two kinds of loans raised in the 
market. 
54. Factories, 1665-67, p. 202. 
55. Factories, 1668-69, p. 195. 
56. Ruquia Husain, 'Khwaja Minas, an Armenian Merchant', Indian 
History Congress, Srinagar, 1986. (duplicated). 
78 
The English factors seem to have used the variants of a 
single indigenous term to characterize both bottomry and respon-
dentia. Perhaps instances of bottomry being rate in relation to 
respondentia, while the latter was even entered into by general 
merchants, the line demarcating them was very thin. 
It has been argued that the term used by the English 
factors to designate these practices is the corruption of an 
58 
Indian term 'awak', which Wilson describes as meaning loans made 
59 
on respondentia arrangements in Western India. This is adduced 
by the account of merchant Hovkhannes who used the term 'avak' 
for a practice no different from respondentia. 
57. Respondentia would be favoured not only because it would 
finance the trading ventures of ordinary merchants, but 
also because it would be a technique through which even 
a small merchant could invest his capital for higher 
returns. Hovhannes borrowed a paltry sum of 50 rupees 
at 0.75 percent, only to lend it on 'avak' at 27 percent. 
Khachikian, p. 175. 
58. Qaisar, 'Merchant Shipping in India during Seventeenth 
century, op.cit., pp. 211-12. 
59. Wilson, op.cit., p. 40, s.v. 'Awak'. 
60. Khachikian, p.175. The etymology of the term is yet to 
be traced. Even this evidence can not be treated conclu-
sive for phonetic exactitude, as the Armenian merchant 
frequently substituted the plosive 'g' with 'k', see, for 
instance, p. 172. 
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The risks the lender bore to the sum advanced for loan 
61 
primarily included slip wreckage and dangers from pirates. The 
seaworthiness of the ship, therefore, was also assessed while 
62 
transacting such loans. 
Besides the risks at sea, the high respondentia rates were 
also determined by two other factors; the nature of the voyage, 
and the duration of the loan. One reason ascribed to the high 
rates on Khwaja Minas' voyage ('40*, 50, 60%)' was the great 
63 
returns the merchants expected the venture to yield. The dura-
tion of the loan combined both the length of sailing and the time 
taken for repayment after arrival at destination. The rates 
Tavernier has quoted vary with the distance of the place from 
Surat. In our records we do not often find any time limit 
prescribed for repayment of loan after the ship's' arrival. There 
were, however, two occasions where the loans were set to be paid 
65 
once after 105 days, and on the other occasion, after six 
months of arrival at destination.^^ The time limit for payment. 
61. Ovington, op.cit., p. 174; Tavernier, 1, p. 156. 
62. Aras-aratnam, op.cit., p. 279 for European ships attrac-
ting low interest rates. 
63. Factories, 1668-69, p. 195. 
64. Tavernier, 1, pp. 30-32. 
65. Khachikian, p. 175. 
66. Annals, III, pp. 202-3. 
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therefore, apparently varied with individual transactions. In 
case of early eighteenth century Coromandel coast, the time limit 
appeared to have usually been of 21 days after which if the 
payment was made,the interest was further calculated on the basis 
67 
of inland rates of interest. 
Little can be said about the class of people who dabbled 
in this business. Ovington is explicit about the banlyas of 
68 
Surat lending money on respondentia. The baniyas, as we know. 
Included small and big merchants, money lenders, sarrafs, and 
brokers, the divisions being based on specialization of functions. 
The question arises precisely which commercial group or groups 
specialized in respondentia arrangements. 
Two big merchants of Surat, one of them • also a money 
lender, were reported to have refrained from investing their 
money in 'avog'. This seems reasonable as big merchants would 
have never liked their capital to be blocked for an unknown 
period of time or even for a known long duration. 
It is true that the system of Insurance in Mughal India 
69 
facilitated respondentia arrangements. In Wilson's glossary, 
the term 'awak-vyaji3 is explained as : 
67. Arasaratnam, op.cit., p.277. 
68. Ovington, op.cit. , p. 174. 
69. Habib, 'Merchant Communities', p. 36, 
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"a transaction In which a person who had made a 
respondentia advance enters into an engagement 
with some third person, who, for a bonus or 70 
stipulated interest. Insures him against loss". 
The Impression which Tavernier gives of the Mughal nobles 
conducting this business needs further corroboration. The nobles 
Indeed had plenty of idle capital which could be put to such a 
use either directly or though some agency. 
The English merchants in India were quick to realize the 
profitability of this practice. They financed their silk trade 
with Persia by lending money on respondentia to Surat merchants 
71 
sending their goods aboard English ships. The transaction was 
expected to yield a profitof 14 to 18 percent between Surat and 
72 
Bandar Abbas in the Persian Gulf. The Persian factors, who 
needed the money for silk investment, however, preferred remit-
tance through ordinary bills of exchange in view of the shipping 
l^ 
hazards. 
70. wilsvjL. op.cit . , p . 40, s. v, 'Awak Vyajil ' c i t ed in Qaisar , 
o p . c i t . , p. 212. 
71 . F a c t o r i e s , 1637-41, p. 272. 
72. I b i d . 
73. F a c t o r i e s , 1651-54, pp. 211-12. 
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The English factors also augmented the riches they 
acquired through private trade by letting them out as respon-
dentia loans. Even the deceased English factors in India left 
a provision in their wills for their estates to be transferred to 
75 
England through respondentia bills of exchange. In 1675, we find 
the President of the Bombay Factory financing coastal trade by 
7b 
lending money to the Bombay merchants on 'bottomry bonds'. 
Unfortunately we do not have the exact terms these bonds bore, 
77 
a s we have them for another region. But it is certain that the 
undertakings were firmly laid out before the transaction was 
78 . 
concluded. These probably varied with each transaction. 
Tavernier describes yet another practice at Goa which 
contained elements characteristic of both respondentia and 
commenda''.^  It is, however, not clear whether the people using 
such commercial techniques were Portuguese or indigenous merchants. 
74. Factories, 1655-60, p. 235n. 
75. Annals, vol. II, part 1, pp. 62-63; vol. Ill, p. 170. 
76. Factories (NS) 1670-77 pp. 131-32. The English were also 
kept posted with the fraudelent practices of merchants on 
such loans. Factories, 1665-67, p. 202. 
77. Arasaratnam, op.cit., pp. 275-78. 
78. Factories, 1634-36, p. 232. 
79. Tavernier, 1, p. 156. See Abraham.!. Udovitch, 'Commercial 
Techniques in Early Medieval Islamic Trade', in Islam and 
The Trade of Asia, ed. D.S. Richards, Oxford, 1970, pp. 
47-8; and Postan, Medieval Trade and Finance, Cambridge, 
1973, pp. 68-69 for Commenda contracts in Europe and the 
Islamic East. 
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APPENDIX - I 
INSURANCE RATES 
INLAND 
Goods Insured Route Rates Remarks and References 
(Percentage of 
insured value) 
Money Golconda to 
Masulipatam 
4 or 5% Factories. 1637-41, 
p. 262. 
Bullion Daman to Surat 1% Factories, 1646-50, 
p. 88. 
'hundl' Ahmadabad to 
Thatta n 
Factories, 1646-50, 
p. 102 
Cochineal Surat to Agra 2i% Factories, 1655-60, 
p. 15 
Cash Surat to 1% 
Eastern Coast 
Ibid. p. 42 
Cash Surat to 
Dharangaon 
U % Factories (NS), 1680-84 
(Insurance p. 306 
and other 
charges) 
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MARINE 
Year Cargo Voyage Rates Remark and Reference 
(Percentage of 
value insured) 
1622 'Goods' Cambay to 2 or 2|% Factories, 1622-23 
Swally p. 101 
1643 English Surat onwards 3 to 30% Factories, 1642-45 
ship (Round Voyage) p. 92 
1644 'Goods' Surat to Mokha 5% 'Goods' aboard Zahld 
Begs' Ship, 
Factories, 1642-45 
1649 Sugar Surat to ?.}% 
Bandar Abbas 
1653 Dutch Ship - 10% 
p. 177 
1653 English Ship - 6% Ibid 
1665 Cash Surat to Caltx^ ut 4i% Factories, 1665-67, 
p. 100 
1669 Lead Surat to Cambay (10% Factories, 1668-69, 
minus cost p. 90 
of carriage 
from Surat 
to Cambay) 
Factories, 
Factories, 
p. 161 
1646-50 
p. 259 
1651-54 
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APPENDIX II 
RESPONDENTIA RATES 
Year Voyage Rates Remarks and References 
1640 Surat to Bandar Abbas U to 18% Factories, 1637-41, p,272 
1640-62 Surat to Mokha 22 to 24% Tavernier, 1, p. 32 
1640-62 Surat to Basra 22 to 24% Ibid 
1640-62 Surat to Ormuz 16 to 20% Ibid 
1669 Surat to Phllllplnes 45,50, 60% Factories, 1668-69, p. 195 
C. 1684 Surat to Isfahan 2 7% K h a c h l k i a n , p . 175 
C.1684 S u r a t to I s f a h a n 26% I b i d 
C.1684 S u r a t to Basra 20% Ibid 
1689 Surat to China 25% Ovlngton, p. 174 
1720 Bengal to England 25% Annals, III, pp. 202-3. 
CHAPTER - V 
MOVEMENT OF INTEREST RATES 
The rate of Interest represents the cost of credit. A 
study of the behaviour of interest rates in various regions of 
Mughal India over a period of time may thus be a good index of 
the relative availability of credit. Our information largely 
comes from the records of the English factors who obtained 
1 
commercial loans from the $arrafs and merchants. The amounts 
borrowed by the English were often substantial and ran into 
several thousands or even lakhs of rupees; at one time the Dutch 
2 
Company at Surat was reported to have run up a debt of Rs.800,000. 
The loans in these cases seem to have been carried for a 
3 
minimum period of one month, though loans were given for longer 
periods as well. We are told once of the possibility of a higher 
rate being charged on a loan given for as long as a year Ijv 
the banlyas. 
The fact that the English merchants did not normally 
distinguish between the interest rates prevalent in the market 
1. Factories, 1637-41, pp. 116-17; 1655-60, p. 215 and n. 
2. Factories, 1646-50, p. 376, Habib, 'Usury In Medieval 
India', p. 402. 
3. Factories, 1622-23, pp. 283-4. 
4. Pelsaert, op.cit. 
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and those which they paid on their borrowings suggests that the 
rates quoted by them represent the normal market rates. There 
is also the evidence of the factors lending money to certain 
merchants and Englishmen on higher rates. In so far as such 
transactions were outside the sphere of normal commerce they 
have largely been left out of account in this chapter. 
The interest rates of the two important commercial towns 
of Gujarat can be studied on the basis of quotations available 
in the English records as well as in the accounts of other 
foreign travellers. The interest rates for Surat are available 
from 1624 to 1694 in twenty nine quotations. Though every year 
is not represented, and this is the case with almost all the 
regions we study (see Appendix to this chapter)one can get a 
broad idea of the movement of the rates over a span of sixty 
years. From 1624 to 1650, there are fifteen quotations of which 
thirteen can serve to work out the average rates prevalent in the 
market on commercial loans. These rates fluctuate from 1 to 1\ 
percent per month with an average of 1.12 percent per month. 
Fourteen quotations are available for the period 1652-1684. 
The rates in this period range from ^ to i percent per month, 
giving an average of 0.62 percent per month. Obviously, then the 
rates in the second half of the seventeenth century were 
88 
substantially lower than in the first half: while in the first 
'half, the rates never fell below 1 percent, in the second half 
they never rose above i percent. 
The rates prevalent at Ahmadabad can be studied from 1622 
to 1683 on the basis of nine quotations which represent the 
position of the market under normal circumstances. The rates 
vary from 1 to Ij percent per month between 1622 and 16A7. From 
1658 to 1683, they fluctuate from | to i percent per month. 
It appears that the movement of the Ahmadabad rates corresponded 
to those of Surat in this period and underwent a fall somewhere 
in 1650's. This was quite possible in view of the geographical 
proximity of the two cities. 
We have interest rates quoted for the city of Agra from 
1626 to 1657. In the period between 1626 and 16A7, they seemed 
to have fluctuated from 1 to 5/8 percent per month. In Agra 
also, a fall is noticeable between 16A7 and 1657, where after 
the rate remained, at the lowest, at i percent per month. 
Information for Patna is desultory. The quotations for 
1620 and 1632, show the rate to be in the range of i and 1 per-
cent per month. 
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For Bengal our information comes from the second half of 
the seventeenth century and the first quarter of the eighteenth 
century. The quotations are for interest charged from the 
English merchants and those which the English themselves charged 
while advancing money to the local merchants. The English 
charged the same interest as they paid; and thus these rates 
may be deemed to represent the normal market rates. 
Since the earliest quotation of the interest rates goes 
back to 1650, nothing much could be said about the first half of 
the century. If we nevertheless take the rate of 1650, which 
is 3 percent per month on the borrowings of the English merchants 
at Balasore, as representative of the maximum rate prevalent in 
the first half of the seventeenth century, it would seem that the 
rates prevalent between 1660 and 1721 represented a secular 
decline. The letter range from 1 percent to li percent per 
month, sometimes going upto 2 percent when the transaction was 
conducted in newly coined rupees. 
The rates In Bengal remained higher than those in Gujarat 
and at Agra. The reason for this is difficult to explain. One 
possible explanation could be scarcer money supply. It has been 
argued that the drain of silver from Bengal in the form of 
revenue to the Mughal exchequer was responsible for the paucity 
90 
5 
of silver in Bengal. Besides, there was a continuous drain of 
specie, mainly silver, in the form of up-country remittances of 
the Mughal nobles and big merchants, to northern and western 
6 
India. It seems that despite the sea-borne influx of silver in 
Bengal in the second half of the seventeenth century, there 
remained capital shortages which led to high Interest rates. 
Master informs us that the officials of Shaista Khan, the subedar 
of Bengal, lent money to the merchants of Hugli at the exorbitant 
rate of 2 to 4 percent per month. The fact that the merchants had 
to sometimes resort to credit at such high cost suggests that 
there was a real drying up of marl' t resources at times such an 
explanation, however, needs to be treated as provisional, and 
further study is required of the quantities of silver drained 
from Bengal as adjusted against the silver it received for its 
exports. 
The rates in the Golconda kingdom, in particular Masuli-
patara, are available for the period 1633 to 1699. Between 1633 
5. Moreland, From Akbar to Aurangzeb, op.cit. , pp. 178-82. 
Susil Chaudhuri while contesting Moreland's hypothesis of 
rise in prices as a result of silver influx in Bengal, 
does not, however, contest this aspect. Trade and Commer-
cial Organization in Bengal, op.cit., pp. 242-8. 
6. Susil Chaudhuri, ibid. 
7. Master, II, p. 80. 
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to 1699. Between 1633 and 1639, the Masulipatam rates range from 
2 to 3 percent per month. If we assume that the Masulipatam 
rates represented those of Golconda generally, then from the 
general rates quoted for Golconda between 1642 and 1654, it 
appears that there was a distinct fall to li percent between 
those years. The Golconda rate again went up to 2 percent in 
1672. The Masulipatam rate in 1676 for which we have a number 
of quotations, was 2 percent per month. The rates from Madras 
showed a greater degree of fluctuation between 1648 and 1665, 
during which period they declined from H to I percent per month 
and then again went up to 1} percent in 1665. The overall rates 
in the Deccan, thus, remained much higher than those in Gujarat 
and Agra, though there seems to have been a fall here to 0, 
The movement of interest in all these regions registered 
an Important change in the middle of the seventeenth century, 
when a substantial fall seems to have occurred universally, the 
rates henceforth approximating to the lower level now reached. 
This casts doubts on K.N. Chaudhuri's denial of any secular 
8' 
movement in this period. 
K.N. Chaudhuri, The Trading World of Asia and the East 
India Company, 1660-1760, 1978, p. 159. 
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9 
While certain non-monetary factors, as level of security, 
10 
the duration of the loan, and sudden pressure on the market as 
a result of some political exigency. Influenced the behaviour 
of the Interest rates, it was largely the relative money supply 
which can be held responsible for bringing about long-term 
changes in the movement of Interest rates. 
Irfan Habib, noticing the decline we have been speaking 
of, has suggested on optimal mix of two possible effects of 
silver Influx in India on interest rates in the seventeenth 
12 
century. 
The Increase in money supply meant more concentration of 
capital In the hands of the merchants and merchant usurers. 
Similarly, the garraf's capital would also increase as a result 
1-3 
of Increased trading in bullion. We have seen that the sarrafs 
9. Factories, 1642-45. pp. 302-3; 1637-41, p. 385. 
10. Pelsaert, op.c11. , pp. 41-2; Annals, III, p. 385. 
11. Factories, 1655-60 p. 196. For the impact of Shlvaji's 
sack of Surat on Interest rates see Factories, 1665-67, 
pp. 19-20. 
12. Cambridge Economic History of India, vol.1, 1982, pp.376-
77. 
13. An increase in commercial capital might simply be the 
result of an Increase in the commerce. However, for a 
different view see Shlreen Moosvi, 'The Silver Influx, 
Money Supply, Prices and Revenue Extraction in Mughal 
India', Journal of Economic and Social History of the 
Orient, vol. XXVIII, p. 29. 
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were able to utilize idle funds of the wealthy people through 
14 
accepting deposits. A decline in the price of silver would 
discourage hoarding, which, along with further dishoarding of 
idle balances, would facilitate the growth of commercial capital 
in the hands of the bankers. 
15 
The influx of silver also resulted in modest price ascents. 
This would have a twin effect on the availability of banking 
capital. An inflation would not only result in an urge to invest 
in commodities whose prices were rising on part of the merchant-
usurers but would also induce them not to block their capital in 
usurious transactions particularly when more avenues were made 
li 
available by expanding commerce. Such a tendency, though res-
tricted to big merchants was fairly brought about in a passage of 
the English factors who reported in 1669 about Mirza Masum and 
Vlrji Vora, the two prominent merchants of Surat : 
14. Irfan Habib, 'A System of Trimetallism in the Age of the 
'Price Revolutiion': Effects of the Silver Influx on the 
Mughal Monetary System', in J.F. Richards ed. The Imperial 
Monetary System of the Mughals, 1987, pp. 137-70. 
15. Irfan Habib, Caste and Money in Indian History, 1987, p.33 
16. Factories, 1637-41, pp. 186-87. 
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"They both are prodigious moneyd men, who having always 
vast treasure ready in house, doe esteeme it safer to invest 
in such solid unperishable commodltys, though they get but 4 and 
6 percent by them, then either in cash or at interest or 
•• L7 avog. .. '•' 
In such a situation even the smaller merchants would 
obviously like to raise money from the market for investment even 
at high interest rates. But, as Habib has suggested, a low 
inflation rate such as the one Mughal India witnessed in the 
sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries would have a very weak 
18 
upward effect on the interest rates. 
It may, then, be supposed that a larger availability of 
capital with the sarraf along with declining pressure on credit 
19 
resources resulted in the lowering of the interest rates in the 
period when silver tended to replace copper as the major monetary 
unit. Zf this phenomenon principally lay behind the decline in 
the Interest rates, then the behaviour of the Interest rates in 
the Deccan is difficult to explain because there the chief 
17. Factories, 1668-69, p. 184. 
18. Cambridge Economic History of India, vol. 1, op.clt., 
pp. 376-7. 
19. Marx notice^ this phenomenon in case of Holland in the 
early seventeenth century when he remarked that the domi-
nance of commercial capital over Interest bearing capital 
resulted in the lowering of the Interest rates. Capital, 
vol. Ill, tr. Moore and Aveling, Moscow, 1959, p.602. 
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20 
currency for monetary transactions remained the gold hun. But 
this could possibly, at the same time, explain why the rates In 
the Deccan remained high in relation to those areas where silver 
21 
coin was principally in circulation. 
It has also been suggested that the seventeenth century 
22 
decline in interest rates was a part of a global movement, where-
by an Increase in the size of the money capital of usurers and 
merchants, as a result of expanding trade and brisk use of commer-
cial paper, cheapened the cost of borrowing. We have seen that 
the sarrafs facilitated the remittance of money and hence created 
bill-money. We also know that English East India Company usually 
paid for its silver in bills of exchange in the London market 
and drew upon Venice, Genoa or Antwerp for raising short term 
commercial loans. A real increase in merchant capital, through 
the guise of bill-money was thus a global phenomenon, the money-
markets in Asia connected with Europe through the Companies as 
well as the Mediterranean trade. 
20. Habib, CEHI, 1, op.cit,, p. 360. 
21. Shireen Moosvi, The Economy of Mughal Ind ia , a S t a t i s t i c a l 
Study, 1981 (unpublished s e c t i o n of the Ph.D. t h e s i s ) , 
pp. 632-7, 
22. Habib, CEHI, 1, pp. 376-77; Moosvi, The Economy of the 
Mughal Empire 1595, p. 374. How far the coming of s i l v e r 
in Europe had influenced the i n t e r e s t r a t e s t h e r e i s an 
i n t e r e s t i n g quest ion on which p r a c t i c a l l y nothing i s 
Known. The lack of i n t e r e s t evinced ' by this t r ade , 
h i s t o r i a n s i s r a the r s u r p r i s i n g . 
23 . K.N. Chaudhuri, The English East India Company, 1600-1640, 
1965, p . 136, 
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So long as European and Indian markets offered alternative 
sources of credit in the financing of Eurasian commerce, a lower-
ing of interest rates in Europe would generate a downward 
movement in India. It is true that the English always remained 
short of adequate capital and resorted time and again to the 
Indian credit-market to raise capital locally. But in an age 
when Amsterdam merchants were borrowing at 3 percent to Aj per-
cent per annum,in Holland and lending in England and France at 
24 
6 percent per annum, it would have be more profitable for the 
25 
English, as the Company factors strongly emphasized at times, to 
import silver into India (out of European borrowings) and convert 
it into money here. 
The interest rates in England declined in the second half 
of the seventeenth century, from 8 to 10 percent per annum to 
26 
4 percent per annum. But they always remained low in comparison 
with the rates prevalent In India. The English complained about 
27 
the high rates they paid on their debts in Surat and other areas 
and unfavourably compared the situation with England where the 
24. Sidney Homer, History of Interest Rates, 1963, p. 129. 
25. Factories, 1665-60, p. 215. 
26. K.N. Chaudhuri, op.cit. , pp. 219-20; Moreland, Peter Floris 
His Voyage to the East Indies in the 'Globe', 1611-1625, 
1934, p. XXX. 
27. Factories, 1646-50, pp. 278; 332-33; 1655-60, p. 215. 
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28 
interest rates seemed half of those prevalent at Surat. They 
therefore, themselves lent money on Interest whenever they had 
29. 
it in plenty. The Surat factors once asked the Directors for 
a double stock of money, seeing that the sarra"fs were allowing 
as high a rate as 7i percent per annum on deposits. The venture 
seemed quite profitable when money was available in England for 
31 
4 percent per annum. But the requisite capital, to enable the 
factors to set up as money-lenders was not actually sent. Even 
then, the English factors were sometimes successful in pushing 
32 
the interest rates down, by bullion imports. 
An interesting feature of the credit market in Mughal 
India was that the s tate had practically no role to play in the 
fixation of the interest rates of commercial loans, as it did 
33. 
in case of musa adat (loans advanced by imperial treasury). 
28. Ibid. 
29. Factories, 1651-54, p. 302. 
30. Factories, 1655-60, p. 199. 
31. Ibid. , It must be noted that the Surat rates were lower 
than those prevalent in South-east Asia. The English were 
found borrowing money from the Portuguese at Bantam on 
bills of exchange payable at Surat in order to avoid the 
exorbitant rates charged at Bantam, which were 4 or 5 per-
cent per month in 1642. English Factories, 1642-45, p.34. 
32. Factories, 1642, p. 305; Susil Chaudhuri, op.cit., p.117. 
33. Ain-i-Akbari, ed. Blochmann, vol. 1, pp. 196-97. 
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The rates were determined predominantly by the market conditions 
in which the leading money lenders had a significant role. In 
Surat, the English complained about their 'principal creditor', 
for his refusal to lend them below the market rate even for a 
month. He was, however, by way of concession, ready to lend them 
half the amount free of interest. The English say that his 
34 • 
example was followed by 'all the rest'. 
3A. Factories, 1646-50, p. 316. 
APPENDIX - I 
INTEREST RATES 
SURAT 
Years Rates (in percentage 
per month) 
Remarks and References 
1624 
1626 1 to (1) i 
Market rate, Factories 1622-23, p.178. 
Banyas raising the rate, probably with 
the duration of the loan, Pelsaert, 
Remonstrantle, pp. 41-42. 
1630 1 1/8 Debt of English merchants, Factories, 
1630-33, p. 27. 
1631 18 or 20 (probably 
per annum) 
An English factor reportedly lent 
money to merchants and mariners for 
private trade. Factories, 1630-33, 
p. 186. 
1634 1 1/8 Debt of English merchants, Factories, 
1634-36, p. 35. 
•635 On Rs. 20,000 the English obtained 
from Virji Vora, Factories, 1634-36, 
p. 114. 
1636 On Rs. 30,000 borrowed by the English 
from Virji Vora for three months. 
Factories, 1634-36, p. 147. 
1639 U and l\ Dutch merchants paying on Rs. 800,000. 
Factories, 1637-41, pp. 116-17. 
1642 1 or U Market rates, Factories 1642-45, p.34. 
100 
Years Rates (in percentage Remarks and References 
per month) 
164A (1) 1/16 Calculated on the basis of the report 
that the English paid 1/16 percent 
more to Virji Vera than what he 
formerly charged. Factories, 1642-45, 
p. 152. 
1650 25 and 28 per Master of an English ship lent his 
Voyage purser for private trade, Factories, 
1646-50, p. 290. 
1650 1 Debt of English merchants. Factories, 
1646-50, p. 316. 
1651 I Rate at which the company authorised 
the factors to borrow after being in-
formed that this rate was 'usual 
between Banias'J this was contested by 
the factors, Factories, 1651-54, p.86. 
1652 J Lowest rate on one month credit to the 
English, Factories, 1651-54, p. 86. 
1652 J English hoping to borrow at this rate 
Factories, 1651-54, pp. 109-110. 
1652 5/8 English borrowing from one Benidas 
Rs. 20,000. Factories, 1651-54, p.119 
1654 i and 5/8 English debt at two different rates. 
Factories, 1651-54, p. 222. 
1657 5/8 English expected to borrow maximum at 
this rate. Factories, 1655-60, pp. 
144-5. 
1658 5/8 On English debt at this minimum rate. 
Factories, 1655-60, p. 158. 
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per month) 
1658 I On English debt at a rate charged 
before the arrival of their ships, 
ibid. 
1659 i English finding little to borrow at 
this rate since wars with the Marathas 
had affected the market, Factories, 
1655-60, p. 196. 
1659 J Rate quoted on the private debt of a 
factor, ibid. 
1659 5/8 The minimum rate at which sarrafs 
could accept deposits from the English, 
Factories, 1655-60, p. 199. 
1659 5/8 Rate which the English paid on sarrafs 
loans, ibid. 
1665 I Normal market rate paid by the mer-
chant, Factories, 1665-67, p.5. 
1665 i English willing to lend at this rate 
to credit worthy merchants at a time 
when money was scarce as a result of 
Shivaji's raids, Factories, 1665-67, 
pp. 19-20. 
1681 ^ English succeede in reducing the 
interest rate on their loans. 
Factories (NS), 1678-84, p. 271, 
1682 i English debt, ibid., p. 324. 
1684 I On an Armenian merchants loan raised 
from a 'middle man'. Khachikian, p.175. 
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AHMED ABAD 
Years Rates (in percentage Remarks and References 
per month) 
1622 1 English demanding interest on the 
amount lying with the Mughal Governor 
of Agra, Factories. 1622-23, pp.283-4. 
1628 1 On Rs. 10,000 borrowed by the English 
from Santidas, Factories, 1624-29, 
p. 215. 
1628 i English borrowing Rs. 8000 after pled-
ging gold. Factories, 1624-29, p.270. 
1640 Above li English failing to borrow at li per-
cent. Factories, 1637-41, p. 225. 
1647 13/16 Lowest rate allowed by the lenders on 
English borrowing. Factories, 1646-50, 
p. 128. 
1647 Above i English trying to reduce the rate to 
i on their debt Factories, 1646-50, 
p. 112. 
1658 5/8 English hoping to get loans at this 
rate. Factories, 1655-60, pp. 144-5. 
1658 i On Rs. 24,000 debt of the English, 
Factories, 1655-60, p. 163. 
1658 5/8 Arrangement with one 'Change Ragoge' 
for loans to the English, ibid. 
1683 i English debt, Factories, (NS), 1678-84, 
p. 324. 
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AGRA 
Years Rates (in percentage Remarks and References 
per month) 
1626 
1628 
1645 
5/6 and 1 
2 
1 to 3/4 
1645 
1645 
1645 
7/8 
5/8 
1 to 2i 
Market rates, Remonstrantie, p. 28. 
On English borrowing, Factories, 1624-
29_., p. 239. 
English reducing the rate on their 
loans, Factories, 1642-45, pp. 301-3, 
1645 1 English debts on loans taken previously 
ibid. 
Fresh loans incurred by English, ibid. 
s'arrafs paying on deposits, ibid. 
sairraf s' rates on loans given to people 
of varying reputation, ibid. 
1647 i English paying on the debts. Factories, 
1646-50, p. 122. 
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PATNA 
Years Rates (in percentage Remarks and References 
per month) 
1620 i On English borrowing, Factories, 1613-
2]_, p. 196. 
1632 1 Peter Mundy charging from the buyers 
of his goods on payments made after 
one month, Mundy, II, p. 149. 
1719 1 English debts, Annals, III, pp.193-4. 
1721 4i Extreme paucity of money at Patna com-
pelled the English to borrow at this 
high rate (time period not specified, 
but the rate was probably per month). 
Annals, II, p. 395. 
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Years Rates (In percentage Remarks and References 
per month) 
1650 3 English debt at Balasore, Factories, 
1646-50. p. 338. 
1660 1| Private borrowings of the English mer-
chants within the company, Factories, 
1661-64, pp. 400-1. 
1664 1 Private borrowing of the English mer-
chants within the company. Factories, 
1668-69, p. 171. 
1668 2 to 4 Officials of Shaista Khan lending 
money to the Hugli merchants, Master, 
II, p. 80. 
1669 2 Governor of Hugli borrowing Rs.30,000 
from the Nawab, Factories, 1668-69, 
p. 299. 
1670-72 1 3/10 English borrowing from the bankers of 
Kasimbazar, Master, 1, p. 427. 
1677-78 1| English debt in Hugli, Master II, pp. 
264-5. 
^678 li English borrowing from one 'Nimdas' in 
Hugli, Master, II, p. 326. 
1678-79 li English debt at Hugli, Master, II, 
pp. 264-5. 
^^^^ H English charging on money advanced to 
the merchants of Kasimbazar, Master,!, 
p. 113. 
^"^^ H and li English charging on money advanced to 
the balasore merchants. Annals, 1, 
pp. 381-83. 
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per month) 
1679 U and 2 Respectively on 'petHH and 'Sicca' 
rupees advanced to Hugli merchants, 
Master, II, pp. 317-19. 
1679 l{ On advances to Balasore merchants 
before the arrival of English ships, 
Master, II, p. 224. 
1679 l\ On advances to Balasore merchants 
under the condition that if anything 
remained due after one month of the 
ships' departure interest would be 
charged on it. Master, II, p. 223; 
Master, I, p. 101. 
1679 l\ On advances to merchants of Balasore 
charged by the English, Master, II, 
pp. 218-19. 
1679 li On English borrowing in the money 
market. Master, I, p. 137. 
1679 1} to li Balasore market rate, ibid. 
1679 1 to U ibid. 
1680 li and 2 On 'petWH and 'Sicca' rupees advanced 
by the English to Hugli merchants, 
Malda Diary, p. 29. 
1680 1 English borrowing Rs. 2000 from a 
banker of Malda, Malda Diary, p.47. 
1680 1 English borrowing Rs. 1500 from one 
'Peeranaut' of Malda, Malda Diary,p.54. 
1680 1 English borrowing Rs. 1000 'peef from 
a banker of Malda, Malda Diary, p.56. 
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per month) 
1680-81 1 1/3 English borrowing Rs. 17,900 'peef 
from Ghanshyamdas at Malda, Malda 
Diary, p. 86. 
1680-81 1 1/8 English borrowing Rs. 1550 'peef from 
one 'Herderam Tewarre' at Malda, Malda 
Diary, p. 88. 
1680-81 1 1/8 English borrowing Rs. 6200 from a 
banker at Malda, Malda Diary, p. 93. 
1682 li English borrowing Rs. 4000 from 
'Herderam Tewarre' and Rs, 1800 from 
'Cussondas Saw' at Malda, Malda Diary, 
p. 188. 
1682 1 English borrowing Rs. 9600 from 
Ghanshyamdas at Malda, Malda Diary, 
pp. 190, 192. 
1682 1 1/8 English borrowing Rs. 3000 from 
'Soodanund' at Malda, Malda Diary, 
p. 194. 
1682 1 English borrowing Rs. 20,000 from 
various merchants of Kasimbazar, Malda 
Diary, p. 173. 
1704 1 English Company's borrowing from 
English factors, Annals, I, p. 253. 
1704 1 On English merchants borrowing, Annals 
1, p. 253. 
1711 1 Borrowing within the English company. 
Annals, II, Part II, p. 17. 
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Years Rates (In percentage Remarks and References 
per month) 
1717 1 English conceding interest to local 
merchants on money advanced by latter, 
Annals, II, Part I, p. 265. 
1718 3 Khwaja Sarhad writes, to the English 
quoting rate for money he borrowed 
from merchants for the Company Annals, 
III, p. 4. 
1718 1 On English factors bill, Annals III, 
p. 55. 
1719 li On money borrowed by English at 
Balasore, Annals, III, p. 158, 
1720 1 Interest rate in Bengal^ Annals, III, 
p. 267. 
1721 1| and 2 Merchants of Kasimbazar paying to the 
sarrafs. Annals, III, p. 370. 
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GOLCONDA 
Years Rates (In percentage Remarks and References 
per month) 
636 
636 
636 
2 and above 
2i and 3 
2\ 
1633 2 On English debt at Masullpatam, 
Factories, 1630-33, p. 277. 
1635 2 and 2\ On debt of English at Masullpatam, 
Factories. 1634-36, p. 140. 
Ibid., p. 212. 
Ibid., p. 295. 
Ibid., p. 318. 
1637 2 On debt of English at Masullpatam, 
Factories, 1637-41, p. 30. 
1638 2, 2\ and 3 On debts of Dutch and Danes at Masull-
patam, ibid., p. 44. 
1639 3 Market rate of Masullpatam, ibid. , 
pp. 146-7. 
1639 2 to 3 On debt of English at Masullpatam, 
ibid., p. 186. 
1639 3 On English debt from the market of 
Masullpatam, ibid. , p. 218. 
1640-67 l\ At Ramalkotta, Tavernier., II, pp.47-8. 
1642 \\ Sar-i-Khail willing to lend 4,-5,000 
pagodas to the English for four or 
five months. Factories, 1642-45, p.69. 
1646 l\ Virji Vora's rates, Factories, 1646-50, 
p. 18. 
1646-7 1 1/16 Virji Vora's rate, ibid., p. 308. 
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Years 
1654 
1672 
1676 
Rates (in percentage 
per month) 
u 
2 
2 and 3 
Remarks and References 
Market rate, Factories, 1651-54, p.222. 
'Interest of this Country' Master, 1, 
297. 
Intra-Company borrowing; increased 
rate if payment made after six months 
at Masulipatam, Master. 1, p.289. 
1676 
1676 
On English debt, Master, 1, p. 297. 
English debt of 375 pagodas owed to 
Mir Nasir, Master, II pp. 100-1. 
1676 Of 600 pagodas owed by English to Haji 
Ambar for six months, ibid. 
1676 Of 400 pagodas the English owed to 
Anis Mir, ibid. 
1672 Of 400 pagodas the English owed to 
Abdullah Baqir for 6 months, ibid. 
1676 On 1485 pagodas of Mir Jamal (the 
English kept the amount interest free 
for six months) ibid. 
1676 Of 100 pagodas of Mir Fakhruddin the 
English owed for 6 months, ibid. 
1699-1702 U , 1 3/5, 2i On loans to merchants of different 
reputation, Norris, p. 164. 
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MADRAS 
Years Rates (in percentage Remarks and References 
per month 
1654 
1658 
1661 
1664 
1664 
li 
u 
3 
l i 
5/6 
1648 1| Lowest current rate, Factories, 1646-
50, pp. 213-14. 
Market rate, Factories, 1651-54, p.233. 
On English lending 2000 pagodas, 
Factories, 1655-60, p. 175. 
Market rate. Factories, 1661-64, p.40. 
Current rate, ibid., p. 390. 
Maximum limit fixed by the company on 
its borrowing. Factories, 1661-64, 
p. 366. 
1665 1} and li On money advanced by English, 
Factories, 1665-67, p. 104. 
1720 i 'St. Georgegll rate. Annals, II, p.267. 
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CHAPTER - VI 
CREDIT AND PRODUCTION 
There will, perhaps, be little dispute that peasants and 
artisans in Mughal India functioned in a fremework of relation-
ships largely conforming to Marx's "Mode of Petty Production" 
that is, they undertook commodity production (production for the 
1 
market) on their own, mainly with the use of family labour. 
One characteristic form in which Marx saw usurers' capital 
as existing in pre-capitalist modes of production was 'usury by 
lending money to small producers who possess their own conditions 
of labour - this includes the artisans, but mainly the peasants 
.2 
It has been argued that money and credit relations 
3 
permeated rural economic life in Mughal India. For the bulk of 
the urban artisans, who were commodity producers and relied 
1. See Irfan Habib, 'Process of Accumulation in Pre-Colonial 
and Colonial India', IHR, Vo. XI, Nos. 1-2, p. 72, for 
'Petty Mode of Production' as well as his reservation in 
the treatment of Mughal Indian peasants as 'Petty 
Producers' for forms of dependence they were subjected to. 
2. Marx, Capital, III, op.cit., p. 594. 
3. Irfan Habib, 'Banking in Mughal India', pp. 1-2. 
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on the agrarian surplus for their subsistence, recourse to 
credit appears to have become even more widespread than In case 
of village artisans. 
While the class of sarrafs and merchant money lenders 
played an Important role In organising commerce by extending 
credit to the merchants, at a lower level, the class of merchant-
usurers supplied credit to peasants and artisans. 
Rural indebtedness of the peasant in Mughal India was 
normally the result of the pressure of revenue, extraction, since 
it often covered his entire surplus; and he had still to pay 
additional taxes. The peasant's most immediate need was obviously 
to meet the cost of seed, cattle and the barest minimum of 
subsistence. In a farman, Aurangzeb exempts such Indigent 
peasants from the poll-tax as remained wholly in debt for their 
Irfan Hablb, 'Usury in Medieval India', p. 394. Also Marx, 
Capital, III, op.cit., p.599 : "The really important and 
characteristic domain of the usurer, however, is the 
function of money as a means of payment. Every payment of 
money, ground-rent, tribute, tax etc. which becomes due 
on a certain date carries with it the need to secure money 
for such a purpose". 
:: 114 :: 
5 
seeds, subsistence and cattle. From eighteenth century Eastern 
Rajasthan, we have instances of the mahijans providing the 
peasants with ploughs, bullocks, seeds and manure, and the 
6 
principal calculated as equal to their market values. 
Since the peasant paid the land revenue in cash, the whole 
of the surplus tended to become a commodity, sold either by the 
peasant himself at the rural market or bought up by the banjaras, 
7, 
the itinerant merchants, or the banlyas, the village traders. 
One finds that mahijans were operating in the rural marts 
(mandis). 
There could theoretically be two forms of artisan produc-
tion in Mughal Indian villages. One was the subsistence-oriented 
5. Nigar nama i Munshi, Lucknow, 1884, p. 139 cited in Irfan 
Habib, 'Usury in Medieval India', p. 394. See Marx, 
Capital, III, op.cit., p. 599 for his perceptive remark : 
"the maintenance or loss of the means of production on 
the part of small producers depends on a thousand contin-
gencies, and everyone of these contingencies or losses 
signifies impoverishment and becomes a crevice into which 
a parasitic usurer may creep". 
6. Dilbagh Singh, 'The Role of Mahaj.an.s in the Rural Economy 
of Eastern Rajasthan during the eighteenth century",Social 
Scientist May 1974, pp. 22-23. 
7. Irfan Habib, 'Merchant Communities', p. 21 and n. 
8. Dilbagh Singh, op.cit., p. 20; S.P. Gupta, The Agrarian 
System of Eastern Rajasthan (c. 1650-1750), Delhi, 1986, 
pp. 140-43. 
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production of the settled artisans, whereby they produced "use-
values' for the village community, and were paid either in kind 
9 
or in revenue free land holdings on a customary basis. The 
other form of artisan production was keyed to the market. Our 
sources are reticent about indebtedness among rural artisans. 
Since the ordinary artisan held the same economic position, while 
cultivating his own land, as that of an ordinary peasant, the 
forms of indebtedness of the village artisan and peasant to the 
rural usurer would closely approximate. In such circumstances, 
real commodity relations may not develop, but credit relation-
ships (credit In kind) could certainly develop. Though the exact 
position of the itinerant artisans, for instance, the rural 
cotton carder (naddaf) or the oil presser (tell), who sometimes 
bartered their skills for raw material and food gains, is not 
very clear, there Is a likelihood of their accepting cash pay-
ments, besides payments in materials they dealt in. 
9. It is difficult to find in Mughal Indian sources a direct 
reference to this phenomenon which existed right from the 
in 
days of pure barter economy. For its presence/ different 
parts of India during period of sixteenth to eighteenth 
century see Chicherov, India, Economic Development in the 
sixteenth centuries, Lahore, 1974, pp. 21-42. For seven-
teenth century western Deccan see Hlroshl Fukazawa, CEHI, 
1, pp. 308-9. 
10. Marx notes that the existence of usurer's capital requires 
commodity production, money and trade, but argues that 
undeveloped forms of merchant capital could arise from 
'direct barter'. Capital, III, op, clt. pp. 323, 594. 
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The burden of rural usury was certainly not light on the 
peasants and artisans. The interest ranged from 10 to 25 percent 
per annum in Eastern Rajasthan, and 114 to 150 percent in some 
12 
cases in Bengal, at the simple rate. The loan was normally 
IB-
advanced for a period of six months in Eastern Rajasthan and for 
U. 
a period of two to three months in Bengal. In both regions, if 
the loan was not paid within the stipulated time, the interest 
was compounded with the principal and a bond was freshly executed 
15 
from the borrower. Hence, the ruin of the peasantry, a phenomenon 
well documented in our period, seems best epitomised in Marx's 
comment that usury led to the "most shameless exploitation of 
the rural population". 
11. Dilbagh Singh, op.cit., p. 24; S.P. Gupta, op.clt., p.142. 
12. Irfan Habib, 'Usury in Medieval India' p. 395. 
13. Dilbagh Singh, op.cit., p. 24. 
14. Irfan Habib, op.cit., p. 395. 
15. Ibid, pp. 394-95; Dilbagh Singh, op.cit., pp. 24-25. 
16. Cf. Diptendra Banerjee, 'Marx, Kovalevsky and Medieval 
India', Indian History Congress, Burdawan, 1985, (unpubli-
shed; duplicated) p. 21. 
117 
Peasants and artisans producing commodities for mid-
distant and distant markets might sometimes bring their products 
to the local marts; but at other times depended largely on brokers 
and merchants for the sale of their products. This dependence 
was on two counts; the latters greater experience of the market 
and its mechanism, and the inadequacy of the rural artisans 
capital to buy raw materials and undertake manufacturing process. 
This was evident in both indigo and textile production. While 
the caste-based division of labour in textile production compelled 
the weavers to buy yarn from the spinners,the lack of adequate 
capital Induced them to sell their woven stuffs half finished in 
the market. Similarly the indigo grower in Gujarat sold the 
raw product (indigo leaf) to the merchants who themselves under-
lie 
took the manufacturing processes. In such cases, the suppliers 
probably could not afford further Investment or they had no 
proper access to the credit market. 
17. Tavernler, I, p. 97. Tavernler offers an interesting 
description of the artisans bringing their products 
cotton, silken stuff and other merchandise to the caravan-
sarais at Banaras from where the foreign merchants 'obtain 
them at first hand*. Also Factories, 1618-21, pp.192-93 
for the weavers bringing their products to the marts of 
Lakhawar and Patna. 
18. Factories, 1618-21, pp. 192-93. 
19. Factories, 1634-36, p. 292. Moreland thinly that these 
'capitalist farmers' financed the indigo cultivators (From 
Akbar to Aurangzeb, Delhi, 1972. p.193). 
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In areas where the merchants had to face competition for 
supplies, credit was extensively used to establish precedence 
over other buyers. Money advances were made accordingly by the 
merchant-usurers to peasants and artisans in indigo and textiles. 
The banjaras themselves, as we have seen, became factors of 
merchant usurers (sahu^ and traded for their principals on the 
20 
credit advanced to them, though, as Malcolm informs us, they 
21 
sometimes "engaged In great speculations on their own account". 
When the English and Dutch merchants entered the Indian 
market to buy indigo and textiles, they found ready to hand the 
system of advancing money loans, with repayment in the commodity 
contracted for. Pelsaert, while discussing the course to be 
followed in buying indigo, says that a class of Indian merchants 
specializing in indigo trade advanced loans to indigo producers 
"some months before hand; binding the debtors to sell to no one 
else". He also speaks of the perfect combination between the 
indigenous merchants and indigo producers with the object of 
23 
denying the foreign merchants a direct access to ithe producers. 
20. Irfan Habib, 'Merchant Communities', p. 6. 
21. Malcolm, II, p. 152-53 
22. Pelsaert, op.cit., pp. 15-16. 
23. Ibid. 
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Big merchant could acquire short term monopolies of indigo 
supply by giving advances to the producers either directly or 
through brokers and agents. 
The position of the foreign merchants in the indigo and 
textile market was different from the indigenous merchants 
operating in the trade. In face of fierce competition among the 
24 
foreign merchants themselves, the producers had a possible choice 
25 
of customers. Also, the array of indigenous intermediaries, 
especially brokers, prevented direct access by foreigners to 
primary suppliers. The rapid ascents in the prices of indigo, 
textiles and other commodities is sufficient indication of the 
ability of the suppliers to react to deman'd; In such a situation, 
the English and the Dutch were quick to adopt the system of 
'sale credits', i.e., credits in the shape of deferred payments 
for the goods purchased, and advances made against future 
-;27 
delivery. Though we have information about the flow of credit 
24. ibid., pp. 15-16; Factories, 1634-36, p. 245; 1646-50, 
p.202, 
25. Moreland, op. cit., pp. 140-1, 145. 
26. Letters Received, op.cit., vol. IV, p. 249. Once the 
ascent was at the tune of 28 percent in fourteen days. 
27. For 'Sale Credits' see Postan, 'Credit in Medieval Trade, 
in Essays in Economic History - 1, ed. Carus - Wilson, 
p. 62-67. 
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28 
from the sellers to the buyers when the former were merchants, 
we do not hear conversely of peasants or artisans delivering on 
credit. 
The English, in 1614, first penetrated the indigo tract 
around Agra and advanced loans to the cultivators to be repaid 
2^ 
in indigo. They realised the advantage tq be had by engaging 
producers to supply at fixed future prices, since otherwise when 
they came just to purchase at the market, they were compelled 
30 
to pay high prices. They realised that it was absolutely necessary 
31 
to advance loans in order to ensure profit. The gain through 
repayment at pre-set prices was substantial enough to make the 
32 
arrangement almost obligatory. 
In 1636, the Dutch advanced Rs, 100,000 to Rs. 150,000 per 
annum to the indigo makers of Surat, even at the cost of borrow-
33 
ing money from the English. If we take Taverniers statement. 
28. Early Travels in India, 1583 - 1619 ed. W Foster, London 
1927, pp. (the travels of Nicholas Withington, 1612-16). 
S. Najaf Haider, 'English Merchants and the Credit Market 
of India in seventeenth century, PIHC, 1987, pp.294-95. 
29. Letters Received, op.cit., II, p. 106. 
30. ibid., VI, pp. 248-49. 
31. Factories, 1634-36, pp. 114, 245-46. 
32. ibid., 1624-29, p. 208. 
33. ibid., 1634-36, p. 245-46. 
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that the Dutch exported Indigo worth Rs. 100000 every year from 
34 
India, to be an index of the average annual purchase of indigo 
by the Dutch, it would seem that the loans equalled the total 
value of the commodity obtained by them annually. 
While in the Agra region, indigo was manufactured in the 
villages, and disposed off by the peasants themselves, in Gujarat, 
the indigo cultivators sold the leaf to the merchants who under-
took the manufacturing process, probably with the help of hired 
36 
labour, and sold the dyestuff in the market. It appears that in 
Gujarat, the English advanced money to this class of merchants 
manufacturers, for when the English tried to reach the cultivators 
directly in an attempt to undertake the manufacturing process, 
37 
the venture proved unprofitable. 
In Bayana, the peasants became debtors to merchants on a 
large scale. The Dutch even went a step ahead in the system of 
advances when they started paying land revenue to the state on 
behalf of the indebted peasants. 
34. Tavernier, II, p. 8, 
35. Irfan Habib, Agrarian Systemr of Mughal India, Bombay, 
1963, p. 58. 
36. Factories, 1634-36, p. 292, 
37. ibid., 1646-50, pp. 77-78, 189, 202-3. 
38. Van Santen, p. 211. 
122 
The role of the merchant capital In textile production 
seems to be almost the same as In the Indigo trade, though here 
certain new dimensions are visible. Though It Is true that the 
export of textiles to Europe formed a small part of total textile 
production In India, a study of the credit operations of the two 
European Companies could still help us to understand the basic 
features of the role of merchant capital in textile production. 
As in indigo trade, the problem of an Immediate and sub-
stantial seasonal rise In the prices of textile goods bewildered 
the European merchants. An English factor once explained the 
uncertainty of prices in Bengal and Patna : "Prices shown are 
what they may be bought for at the beginning of the year, but the 
same sort and goodness to be bought at the time of the arrival 
39 
of the ships will be 30 percent to 40 percent dearer. It appears 
that through the advances the English were not only able to over-
come the abrupt price fluctuations, but also expected to get 
40 
the goods 8 to 10 percent cheaper. The result was certainly 
significant, and a recent author considers it to be a means of 
39. Factory Records, Misc., Ill, ff. 45-46 cited in Susll 
Chaudhury, Trade and Commercial Organization In Bengal, 
1650-1720, Calcutta, 1975, p. 45 and n. For a rise in 
prices upto 50 percent see ibid, p. 101, and Annals, I, 
pp. 377-78. 
40. Master, I, p. 26. 
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reducing price fluctuation and Instability of the market. It 
may be observed, however, that the reduction of the scale of 
price fluctuation for the creditor-buyers would necessarily mean 
a corresponding increase in fluctuations in the open market 
prices, and a disadvantage for the indebted suppliers. 
The competition among the foreign merchants, and special 
requirement in respect of varieties demanded for export could 
lead to spurts in textile prices. The English were always afraid 
of the vast resources of the Dutch, and insisted on larger stock 
to keep the weavers in 'constant employment'. It seems that the 
weavers on their part were ready to go to the highest bidder. 
At Madras, the English expressed their inability to get weavers 
to supply them, since the Dutch had obtained temporary control 
43 
of production through advances. Besides, the Indian weavers had 
a traditional, and familiar, consumer market for their products. 
The European merchants catered to a market which had its own 
requirements. Hence, changes in the dimension of the fabrics 
and colour patterns, insisted upon by the European merchants, at 
44 
times involved alteration in their looms, which required outlay 
41. K.N. Chaudhuri, The Trading World of Asia and the English 
East India Company, 1660-1760, 1978 pp. 142-43. 
42. Susll Chaudhury, op.cit., pp. 54, 56-57. 
43. Moreland, op.cit., pp. 134-5. 
44. Supplementary Calendar, op.cit., pp. 77-78; Master, I, 
p. 400. 
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of money. While it is true that the weavers at times agreed to 
increase and adjust their production to the requirements of the 
foreign merchants, they were never comfortable under this arrange-
ment. The English experience at Nasarpur (Sind) is a case in 
point. For the purchase of narrow baftas at Nasarpur, the 
English were advised to advance loans to the weavers in order 
45 
to obtain the required quality cheaper and in time. After 
contemplating its commercial viability, the English advanced 
money to the weavers. They were, however, disappointed, for they 
found the weavers leaving their work half finished and catering 
to the local cloth merchants even when the latter had made no 
advances beforehand. The weavers' lack of faith was attributed 
by the English to their convenience in weaving familiar patterns 
as opposed to the 'paines' they had to take in adapting to the 
requirements of the English. It is also possible that the local 
merchants, who were selling the cloth at Thatta, were offering 
higher prices to the weavers. 
The system of advances to the weavers was geagraphically 
widespread, and it was practised at almost all the major centres 
45. Factory, 1637-41, p. 137. While the prices of baftas were 
20 to 30 'Gorge' at Thatta, the nearby town, the English 
were getting them for 13 to 19 rupees per 'Gorge' at 
Nasarpur. 
46. Factories, 1646-50, p. 159. 
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of textile production; our evidence specifically covers the whole 
47 48 
of Gujarat, especially Baroda and Surat; Nasarpur in Slnd; 
49 50 
Samana In the Punjab; Masulipatam, Madras and Malabar; and the 
51 
whole of Bengal, especially Kasimbazar, Hugli, Decca and Malda. 
In Bengal, it acquired a technical name, dadani, sinifying the 
52 
'giving out' of money to weavers and merchants. 
Under the dadani system, the sample cloth was brought to 
musters and, when accepted, the price was fixed before the money 
53 
was delivered. It, however, remains doubtful whether the prices 
initially fixed were ever paid for by the merchants. Master 
informs us that the Arab and 'Mogull' merchants at Decca, who 
also seem to have advanced money, never agreed at first on a 
certain price and at the time of delivery got the goods valued 
by the brokers (Dellols') or merchants of the town according to 
the market price, presumably to their own advantage. With the 
English, there was a last - moment adjustment in prices and 
47. ibid, 1618-21, p. 352; 1665-67, pp. 3,7. 
48. ibid., 1637-41, p. 37; 1646-50, p. 149. 
49. ibid., 1624-29, p. 149. 
50. Factories, 1637-41, p. 52; 1661-64, pp. 252-53; Moreland, 
op.cit., pp. 134-35. 
51. Master, op. cit., I, 382-83; II, pp. 14-15; Annals, I, 
pp. 377-78; Malda Diary, op.cit., pp. 178-79. 51 
52. Hobson - Jobson, op.cit., p. 290; Annals, I, pp. 390-1; 
III, pp. 255-56; Malda Diary, op.cit., 178-79; Master, II, 
p. 316. 
53. Malda Diary, op.cit. , p. 87; Annals, I, pp. 390-91. 
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payments. The English demanded abatements over the want of 
l e n g t h s , breadths and f ineness of the c l o t h , which the brokers 
54 
u sua l l y agreed to and made good in s p e c i e . The English a l so 
cross-checked the brokers ' r a t i n g of the goods by u t i l i z i n g the 
s e r v i c e s of the loca l merchants with the consent of the b roke r s . 
In case the product was found u n s a t i s f a c t o r y i t was to be 
56 
re turned to the weavers. The Engl ish Company's account book 
ma 
Intained the entire account of the 'debts upon moneys' advanced 
to buy goods. Advances to the weavers were recorded in a separate 
57 
book. 
As stated earlier, the English were not always happy with 
the working of this system. In the event of occasional failure 
of the weavers, recovery of the money advanced became difficult. 
This forced the English to use an inter-mediary agency so as to 
provide security for return of loans; but this system too had its 
own weaknesses. 
The foremost problem, particularly in Bengal, was the 
existence of a succession of agencies between the weavers and 
54. Master, H , pp. 14-15. 
55. ibid., vide Factories, 1661-64, p. 41. 
56. Factories, 1665-66, p. 200 
57. Annals, I, p. 394; Master, I, p. 282; II, p 316. 
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the English merchants. For inslstance, at Decca, the English 
advanced money to the brokers, who gave it to the pal-kars, the 
latter carrying the money from place to place and delivering it 
58 
to the weavers. Since for the English, the only security for 
their money were the brokers, they were held responsible for any-
thing happening to the money advanced. The brokers received 1 to 
2 percent from the pai-kars, who must, in turn, have been 
charging their commission from the weavers. Thus, these commi-
ssions added to the cost of the credit for the borrower. 
Complaints against the brokers are wLderspread in the 
commercial correspondence of the English factors dealing with 
60 
the advances. In a detailed report of 1662, the President of 
the English factory at Surat brought a series of charges against 
the Company broker, Somaji Chltta. According to him, the broker 
cheated the company for not less than 25 or 30 percent of the 
total money advanced to the weavers by paying them partly In corn 
58. Master II, pp. 14-15. 
59. ibid., Malda Diary, op.cit., pp. 178-79. 
60. The English complained that when the weavers and paikars 
failed to deliver the goods, the brokers seldom repaid the 
amounts due, and that too 'never without contest, trouble 
and charge'. Master, II, pp. lA-15. 
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and partly In cash. Even In cash, payments were made at the 
rates which were less than those actually agreed with the weavers, 
and the discounts on the specie were manipulated by the broker 
to his benefit. Besides, 12 percent was exacted from the 
weavers as brokerage alongwlth the Interest charged on the loans. 
As a result of underpayment, manipulation and harsh exactions, 
the cloth supplied to the English by the weavers was often found 
61 
deficient in quality and measurement. There is also an instance 
of the brokers and weavers combining to keep up the price of the 
6i2 
goods required by the English. 
The problem of risk in dealing with numerous petty 
suppliers was, however, paramount. In 1676, the English at Decca 
were looking for a responsible merchant who could contract for 
63 
their Investments at Balasore and Hugll. At Madras, the English 
delivered money through the 'nayaks' who undertook the respon-
sibility of compensating for all such sums as were advanced to 
the weavers. After suffering losses there also, the English 
6A 
lamented the absence of one "prime merchant who secures all". 
61. Factories, 1661-64, pp. 111-13. 
62. Supplementary Calendar, op.cit., p. 77. 
63. Master, II, p. 15; William Hedges, The Diary of William Hedges 
(1681-87), transcribed, R. Barlow and Henry Yule, 2 Vols. 
Haklyut Society No. LXXIV, Vol. I p. 121. 
64. Factories, 1637-41, pp. 156-57; Moreland, op.cit., pp.134-35. 
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This might also explain why big merchants in Bengal, like 
Chittamal Sah and Chintaman Sah, agreed to act as brokers to the 
65 
English Company. 
Such losses, however, cannot obscure over-all benefit the 
English gained out of this arrangement; thus, their repeated 
66 
acceptance of the indipensability of the system of advances. 
The English were fully aware that they would not be able to 
exploit the credit channels without the help of the indigenous 
merchants and any attempt to dispense with the latter's services 
67 
could limit their profits. The brokers, on their part, resisted 
any direct contact between the actual producers and the ultimate 
68 
buyers in order to preserve their own position. 
The process of textile production, which entailed a social 
and unvaried division of labour, made it imperative for a cloth 
merchant to capture different units of production, each being 
distinct and complete. A network of advances enabled the units 
65. Susil Chaudhury, op.cit., pp. 167, 177-78. 
66. Factories, 1661-64, p. 113; Annals I, p. 380 
67. Factories, 1622-23, p. 104. 
68. Supplementary Calendar, op.cit., p. 75. 
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69 
to be joined together by the creditor. The English went a step 
further when instead of cash they started giving raw materials 
to the artisans. In the case of the silk weavers of Bengal 
the practice was ascribed to the weavers' poverty and inability 
70 
to buy standard silk-thread. Besides, sometimes, the local 
colours not being to their liking, the English themselves wound 
and dyed the raw silk. 
The amount given out in advance by the merchants could in 
itself be raised through credit. In 1679 when the English 
Company's bullion was still at the mint, it charged U and !{ 
percent per month - the market rate of interest - on money in 
current and a sikka rupees respectively advanced to the silk 
merchants of Kasimbazar. Apparently, the English raised the 
money in the market, but shifted the burden of interest to those 
72 
who accepted advances from them. 
The system of advances also helped to obscure the financial 
irregularities of the English factors when they pursued their 
69. Factories , 1630-35, pp. 208-9 for the English buying un-
bleached cloth; and 1646-50 p. 112, for the advances made 
to dyers and beaters. 
70. Factories, 1665-66, p. 296. 
71. ibid. 
72. Master I, p. 113; II, pp. 317-19 and n; Annals, I, pp.39, 
396-97. 
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private interests at the expense of their employers. Edward 
Littleton, who headed the council for separate affairs of the new 
English East India Company, was charged with investing considera-
ble amount of the Company's capital in speculation of his own 
by means of advances made to 'natives' who were really his 'own 
73 
creatures and agents'. 
In the commodity circuit without credit advances, the 
artisan's surplus constituted his capital, and the regeneration 
of production was based on self - generated capital. The inade-
quacy of artisan capital was a fact of life, and explains his 
Inability to cater to the market. Credit from the merchant-
usurer was an answer to this inadequacy; it enlarged artisan 
production, and, in some cases, provided financial security when 
changes were introduced in the instruments of production. 
An Important consequence of the dependence of the peasants 
and artisans on the merchant usurers was their Inability to 
obtain the true value of their product, even if they remained 
73. Annals I, pp. 163-64; also see. Hedges, op.clt., I, pp.82-
83 for similar examples. 
74. For an artisans indebtedness to usurer in fulfilling his 
basic needs see Dabistan 1 Mazahlb, Bombay, cited in Habib, 
•Usury in Medieval India' p. 399. 
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master of It throughout the process of production. Kablr, the 
weaver, visualises himself, in one of his verses, as a pedlar 
whose business involves him in constantly enlarged interest and 
reduced gain; apparently, there was no difference here in the 
76 
approach of the indebted artisan and the debt, encumbered factor. 
The dominance of the merchant unsurer's capital both over 
the forms of artisan-production and the market, thus formed a 
77 
mode of "expropriation of the artisan's 'surplus value'", and 
remained the major source of accumulation of merchant capital 
under the 'Petty Mode of Production'. It may of course, be 
pertinent to enquire whether merchant capital accumulatd from 
usury or whether usurers' capital had its source in capital 
accumulated through commerce. The credit cycle was so complex 
that the question cannot perhaps be satisfactorily answered. 
What we can say with some confidence is only that the generation 
of merchant capital In Mughal India was heavily linked to the 
exploitation of the peasants and artisans through usurious 
operations. 
75. Irfan Hablb, 'Accumulation in Pre-Colonlal India', op.clt., 
p.72. 
76. Sant Kabir, text ed. R. Verma, Allahabad 1957, pp.236-278. 
77. Irfan Habib, op.cit., p. 73 and n. 
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